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Jurisdiction 
The court does not have jurisdiction for reasons explained in this brief. 
Statement of the Issues 
This appeal presents two distinct sets of issues. The first concerns a 
threshold jurisdictional issue as to whether CPG's failure to file a timely notice of 
appeal precludes appellate jurisdiction. The second concerns whether courts 
may vacate arbitration awards when a neutral arbitrator fails to disclose a first-
cousin relationship with a partner at a law firm representing a party. 
I. 
The jurisdictional issue arises because CPG appeals from a combined order 
(i) denying its motion to confirm an arbitration award and (ii) granting 
Westgate's motion to vacate that award. Utah Code section 78B-ll-129(l)(c) 
provides a statutory right to appeal an order denying a motion to confirm an 
arbitration award. Thus, if the district court had denied CPG's motion to confirm 
the award in a separate order, there is no question that CPG would have had an 
appeal of right. But the order also vacates the award and directs a rehearing, a 
type of order that is not listed as appealable under section 78B-11-129(1). In 
CPG's view, coupling the order vacating the award with the order denying 
confirmation strips CPG of its right to appeal the denial of its motion to confirm. 
Issue 1: Whether an order denying a motion to confirm an arbitration 
award, but also granting a motion to vacate that same award with a rehearing, is 
an appealable order under the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, where that Act 
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provides for an appeal of right from an order denying a motion to confirm an 
award but is silent on whether orders vacating awards with a rehearing may be 
appealed as a matter of right. 
Standard of Review: The court reviews the interpretation of a statute for 
correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, Tf 17,977 P.2d 1201. 
IL 
Under Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party 
exercising an appeal of right must file a notice of appeal in the district court 
within 30 days. Appellate courts cannot suspend that requirement. Utah R. 
App. P. 2. It is undisputed that CPG did not file a notice of appeal in the district 
court within 30 days. Instead, it filed a Rule 5 petition in this court, even though 
Utah law established a right to appeal from the type of combined order at issue 
here. Hicks v. UBS Fin. Servs., 2010 UT App 26, t1f 15-17,226 P.3d 762. 
Issue 2: Whether a party satisfies Rule 4(a)'s jurisdictional requirement by 
filing a Rule 5 petition in an appellate court, where Utah law provides an appeal of 
right and the rules of appellate procedure do not allow suspension of Rule 4(a)'s 
requirement that a notice of appeal be filed in the district court within 30 days. 
Standard of Review: Subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of 
law. Ameritemps, Inc. v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2007 UT 8, f 6,152 P.3d 298. 
III. 
On the merits, the district court denied CPG's motion to confirm because 
arbitrator Richard Burbidge had failed to disclose his first-cousin relationship 
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with George Burbidge, a shareholder at Christensen & Jensen, the law firm 
representing CPG. Under section 78B-11-113(5), when a neutral arbitrator fails to 
disclose a "known, existing, and substantial relationship," the arbitrator is 
presumed to have acted with partiality and the award must be vacated. The 
Manual for Commercial Arbitrators published by the AAA describes a second-
cousin relationship as warranting vacatur. In the district court, CPG attempted 
to rebut that presumption with an affidavit from attorney Burbidge about the 
nature of his relationship with arbitrator Burbidge, but provided no evidence 
from arbitrator Burbidge concerning whether he acted with partiality. 
Issue 3: Whether a statutory presumption that an arbitrator acted with 
partiality may be rebutted with evidence from a third party concerning the 
arbitrator's relationship with counsel, where there is no evidence concerning 
whether the arbitrator acted with partiality. 
Standard of Review: The court reviews the interpretation of a statute for 
correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,117,977 P.2d 1201. 
Independent of the statutory presumption, section 78B-11-113(4) provides 
that a district court "may vacate an award" when an arbitrator fails to disclose an 
existing relationship with counsel, substantial or otherwise. 
Issue 4: Whether district courts have discretion to vacate arbitration 
awards where a neutral arbitrator fails to disclose an existing first-cousin 
relationship with a shareholder at a law firm representing one of the parties. 
3 
Standard of Review: The district court's exercise of its permissive grant of 
authority to vacate an award is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Paul 
deGroot Bldg. Servs., L.L.C v. Gallacher, 2005 UT 20, If 22,112 P.3d 490 ("[B]y 
selecting the word 'may' to describe the authority of the trial court, the 
legislature clearly signaled an intention to yield discretion to courts."). 
V. 
Westgate did not investigate the veracity of arbitrator Burbidge's 
disclosures and did not object to his relationship with attorney Burbidge until 
Westgate first learned of that relationship after the arbitration. Section 78B-11-
113(1) does not imposes a duty to disclose on potential arbitrators. 
Issue 5: Whether a party waives the right to have an arbitration award 
vacated where the party raises the issue after the panel issues its award, but the 
party first learned of the panel member's substantial relationship with the other 
party's law firm only after the panel had issued its award. 
Standard of Review: Waiver presents "mixed questions of law and fact 
and this court therefore grants broadened discretion to the trial court's findings." 
Chen v.Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 23,100 P.3d 1177. 
Determinative Provisions 
Determinative provisions are at Addendum B. 
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Statement of the Case 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
On October 27,2008, the district court compelled CPG to submit to 
arbitration its claims against Westgate arising under the Utah Pattern of 
Unlawful Activities Act (the "UPUAA"). (R. 4607,4713-18.) While the district 
court case also involves other claims against Westgate, only those UPUAA claims 
sent to arbitration are relevant to this appeal. 
The order compelling arbitration required each party to select an arbitrator 
and those two arbitrators to select a third arbitrator. (Id.) Westgate selected 
Judith Billings, CPG selected Richard Burbidge, and those two arbitrators 
selected Paul Felt. (R. 5954.) The panel held hearings in December and January 
2009, after which the panel entered an award in favor of some claimants for 
$65,500. (R. 5935-47.) CPG moved the arbitration panel for an award of attorney 
fees in the amount of $1,195,174.07. (R. 5870.) CPG separately moved the district 
court to confirm the arbitration award. (R. 5797-66.) 
After the panel entered its award in favor of CPG, Westgate became aware 
that arbitrator Burbidge had a first-cousin relationship with George Burbidge, a 
shareholder at Christensen & Jensen, the law firm representing CPG under a 
contingent fee agreement. (R. 5907, 6049-50.) Westgate moved to vacate the 
arbitration award based on that relationship. (R. 5909.) On December 13,2010, 
the district court, in a single order, both granted Westgate's motion to vacate and 
denied CPG's motion to confirm the arbitration award. (R. 6157-58.) The parties 
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agree that the district court's order also directs a rehearing of CPG's claims. 
(Addendum C at 8; AOB at 13-14.) 
CPG petitioned this court under Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure for review of the district court's order as though it were an 
interlocutory order. (Addendum D.) CPG did not file a notice of appeal in the 
district court. Nor did it file any other paper indicating it was exercising its right 
to appeal the order under the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act. (Addendum E.) 
This court provisionally granted CPG's petition for interlocutory review 
and requested that the parties address two preliminary questions: (i) whether the 
order was subject to direct appeal pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-1-129 or 
otherwise constituted a final judgment for purposes of appeal; and (ii) whether 
this court has jurisdiction to review the order under Rule 5. (Addendum A.) 
Despite the court's expressed concerns over jurisdiction, CPG moved for 
summary reversal of the district court's order. (Addendum F.) The court 
deferred ruling on CPG's motion until plenary briefing on the merits. 
(Addendum G.) This is that briefing. 
II. Statement of Facts 
This case began in 2002 with Westgate's filing a claim against Shaun Adel, 
a former employee. Westgate alleged that Mr. Adel had misappropriated 
Westgate records for the purpose of contacting Westgate's potential customers 
and persuading them to assign to CPG consumer protection claims which CPG 
could collectively prosecute against Westgate. (R. 7-8.) CPG then filed various 
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counterclaims on behalf of prospective Westgate customers alleging, among 
other things, that Westgate fraudulently induced them to attend sales 
presentations by offering incentives (such as a gift certificate to a local mall or a 
certificate that could be exchanged for a trip) that allegedly were not as valuable 
as Westgate had represented. In March 2005, CPG amended its counterclaims to 
allege that the same conduct also violated the UPUAA. (R. 2755.) 
Later, pursuant to a statutory arbitration provision, Westgate moved to 
compel arbitration of the UPUAA claims. On October 27,2008, the district court 
granted Westgate's motion, while leaving CPG's other counterclaims in the 
district court. (R. 4713-18.) The order instructed each party to select one 
arbitrator and then required those two party-appointed arbitrators to select a 
third arbitrator. (R. 4718.) Westgate selected retired judge Judith Billings and 
CPG selected Richard D. Burbidge. Judge Billings and arbitrator Burbidge then 
selected Paul Felt as the third arbitrator. (R. 5954.) 
After the arbitrators were selected, but prior to the arbitration hearing, the 
arbitration panel prepared an "Arbitration Fee Agreement" for the parties, which 
recited that all the arbitrators considered themselves neutral. (R. 5831.) On 
February 2,2010, after a week-long arbitration proceeding, the panel entered its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Award. (R. 5935-47.) In the award, 
the panel found Westgate's conduct to be in violation of the UPUAA and 
concluded that, of the 208 claims presented by CPG, 131 claimants had been 
injured by Westgate's conduct. The panel found that each of the injured 
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claimants had been damaged in the amount of $500. (R. 5940.) The panel 
awarded CPG $65,500 with interest at the legal rate from October 23,2003. 
(R. 5937.) Following the panel's entry of the award, CPG moved the arbitration 
panel for an award of nearly $1.2 million in attorney fees. (R. 5870.) 
On March 30,2010, Westgate learned that arbitrator Burbidge is a first 
cousin of attorney George W. Burbidge II, a shareholder of Christensen & Jensen, 
P.C. (the law firm representing CPG in this case). (R. 6048-50.) That familial 
relationship w as not disclosed to the parties by arbitrator Burbidge at any time 
prior to or during the arbitration proceeding. (R. 5907.) Christensen & Jensen 
certainly was aware of the relationship but also neglected to disclose it to 
Westgate even though George Burbidge as a shareholder likely would benefit 
from any contingent fee recovery. (R. 5905-07.) 
On December 13,2010, the district court entered an order vacating the 
arbitration award. (R. 6157-58.) In its related ruling, the court concluded that the 
first-cousin relationship between arbitrator Burbidge and attorney Burbidge 
should have been disclosed to Westgate before the arbitration because a 
reasonable person would consider that relationship likely to affect the 
impartiality of the arbitrator. (R. 6134.) The court also concluded that, because 
arbitrator Burbidge acted as a neutral arbitrator, his failure to disclose this 
relationship gave rise to a presumption, under Utah Code section 78B-11-113(5), 
that he acted with evident partiality. (Id.) 
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Summary of the Argument 
This court lacks jurisdiction to review the district court's combined order 
(i) denying CPG's motion to confirm an arbitration award and (ii) granting 
Westgate's motion to vacate that award. In February 2010, the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that a party has an appeal of right from such a combined order. 
Hicks v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 26,226 F.3d 762. Yet 10 months 
later—in December 2010—CPG did not file a notice of appeal in the district court. 
Instead, it filed a Rule 5 petition in this court. 
In the opening brief, CPG does not cite Hicks or address Hicks. Instead, 
CPG asserts that it had no appeal of right because the district court directed a 
rehearing. (AOB at 14.) CPG ignores both Hicks and the language in section 
78B-ll-129(l)(c) expressly providing an appeal of right from an order denying a 
motion to confirm an arbitration award. CPG focuses instead upon the negative 
implication of language in section 78B-ll-129(l)(e) providing an appeal of right 
from orders vacating arbitration awards "without rehearing/7 CPG provides no 
authority for reading into section 78B-ll-129(l)(c) a limitation that does not exist. 
Section 78B-ll-129(c) does not say that parties may appeal an order denying 
confirmation "unless the court also directs a rehearing/7 This court should 
decline CPG's invitation to read that limitation into the statute. 
CPG also invites this court to forgive its failure to file a notice of appeal. 
(AOB at 16-17.) This court should decline that invitation as well. First, Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 permits the suspension of certain rules, but does 
not permit the suspension of Rule 4(a)'s jurisdictional requirement that a notice 
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of appeal be filed with the trial court within 30 days. Second, for jurisdictional 
purposes a Rule 5 petition is not a substitute for a Rule 4 notice of appeal: "It is 
not unreasonable to require attorneys to correctly apply clear and unambiguous 
procedural rules." Clark v. Archer, 2010 UT 57, f 13,242 P.3d 758. At the time 
CPG filed its petition, Hicks was "clear and unambiguous" that parties have an 
appeal of right from the type of order at issue here. CPG's failure to file a notice 
of appeal in the district court within 30 days precludes appellate jurisdiction. 
If the court reaches the merits, it should affirm. Arbitrator Burbidge failed 
to disclose that his first cousin was a shareholder at the law firm representing 
CPG, a relationship the AAA considers substantial. Utah Code section 78B-11-
113(5) provides that, if an arbitrator acting as a neutral fails to disclose a "known, 
existing, and substantial relationship with a party," then the arbitrator is 
presumed to have acted with partiality and any award must be vacated. And 
under sections 78B-ll-113(l)(b) and 113(4), where any arbitrator—neutral or 
otherwise—fails to disclose an "existing" relationship—substantial or 
otherwise—with a party or counsel, the court "may vacate an award." 
While either statutory provision provides ample basis to affirm, the 
opening brief addresses only section 78B-ll-113(5)'s presumption. CPG asserts 
that the presumption is not dispositive because (i) arbitrator Burbidge was party 
appointed and not "neutral," and (ii) CPG rebutted the presumption that 
arbitrator Burbidge acted with partiality with an affidavit of attorney Burbidge. 
(AOB at 20-28.) This court should reject both arguments. 
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The UPUAA's broad disclosure requirements reflect the fact that judicial 
review of the merits of arbitration awards is extremely narrow, so full disclosure 
is required to allow the parties to ensure the integrity of the arbitration process. 
Potential arbitrators who—like the arbitrators here—will act as neutrals must 
comply with the disclosure requirements, regardless of the selection mechanism. 
Failure to do so gives rise to section 78B-ll-113(5)/s presumption that the 
arbitrator acted "with evident partiality." CPG misunderstands section 78B-11-
113(5) as creating a "presumption of substantial relationship" and attempts to 
rebut that presumption with the affidavit of attorney Burbidge describing his 
relationship with arbitrator Burbidge. But the relevant presumption is a 
"presumption of partiality," something CPG does not address. CPG provided no 
evidence from arbitrator Burbidge concerning whether he acted with partiality. 
Wholly apart from section 78B-ll-113(5)'s presumption, section 78B-11-
113(4) provides that a district court "may vacate an award" if any arbitrator fails 
to disclose any "existing" relationship with a party or its counsel. (AOB at 30.) 
CPG does not address this ground, which is an adequate basis to affirm. 
Finally, CPG argues that Westgate waived its right to challenge arbitrator 
Burbidge's non-disclosure by failing to investigate the relationship and objecting 
only when it became aware of the relationship after the arbitration. (AOB at 30-
34.) Yet under the UPUAA, the responsibility to inquire into and disclose the 
existence of biasing relationships rests with arbitrators, not with the parties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(1). If this court reaches the merits, it should affirm. 
11 
Argument 
This appeal presents a threshold jurisdictional issue and several merits 
issues concerning whether district courts may vacate arbitration awards when an 
arbitrator acting as a neutral fails to disclose a first-cousin relationship with a 
shareholder of the firm representing a party to the arbitration. Westgate will 
address the jurisdictional issue before addressing the merits. 
1. The Court Should Dismiss CPG's Appeal For Lack of Jurisdiction 
The court lacks jurisdiction over CPG's appeal because CPG did not file a 
timely notice of appeal in the district court required by Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a). Under section 78B-11-129(1), CPG had an appeal of right from 
the district court order at issue here. Yet CPG failed to file a notice of appeal 
within the 30-day jurisdictional limit. This court should dismiss CPG's appeal. 
A. Utah Law Was "Clear and Unambiguous" That CPG Had an 
Appeal of Right from the District Court's Order But CPG Failed to 
File a Notice of Appeal Within the 30-Day Jurisdictional Limit 
Under Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[i]n a case in 
which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the 
appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the 
clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from." Utah R. App. P 4(a) (emphasis added). And under Rule 
2, while appellate courts may suspend most of the rules, they may not suspend 
the requirements in Rule 4(a): "In the interest of expediting a decision, the 
appellate court, on its own motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may, except 
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as to the provisions of Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), 48,52, and 59, suspend the 
requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a particular case and may 
order proceedings in that case in accordance with its direction/' Utah R. App. P. 
2 (emphasis added). 
Thus, this court cannot forgive a failure to comply with Rule 4(a) where a 
party has an appeal of right. Saratoga Holdings, LLC v. Hall 2011 UT App 166, 
flf 3-4 & n.l, 682 Utah Adv. Rep. 69 (court lacked authority to forgive an 
appellant's failure to file a timely notice of appeal because rule 2 "specifically 
states that [the] court cannot suspend the requirements of rule 4(a)/'); see also In 
re A.B., 2010 UT 55, | 43,245 P.3d 711 (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction 
where notice of appeal was not signed by appealing party). 
Here, CPG had an appeal of right. Section 78B-ll-129(c) provides a 
statutory right to appeal an order "denying confirmation of an arbitration 
award." The district court's order denied CPG's motion to confirm an arbitration 
award. (R. 6157.) Therefore, Rule 4(a) required CPG to file a notice of appeal in 
the district court within the 30-day deadline, which it failed to do. While the 
order denying the motion to confirm also vacated the same arbitration award 
and directed a rehearing, those additional mandates in the order do not change 
the analysis. (Id.) Indeed, just 10 months before CPG filed its Rule 5 petition, the 
Utah Court of Appeals held that parties have an appeal of right from the denial 
of a motion to confirm an award even where the same order also vacates the 
arbitration award and directs a rehearing. Hicks v. UBS Fin. Servs., 2010 UT App 
13 
26, f t 15-17,226 P.3d 762. The Hicks court held that, by enacting the 
appealability provision of the UPUAA, '"the legislature added to, rather than 
subtracted from, the situations where an appeal may be filed as a matter of 
right."' Id. f 16 (quoting Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 382 v. Utah Transit 
Auth., 2004 UT App 310,111,99 P.3d 379).* Under Hicks, CPG's statutory right 
to appeal was clear. 
This court's recent case law confirms that where a party has an appeal of 
right, its failure to file a notice of appeal in the district court in compliance with 
Rule 4(a) precludes appellate jurisdiction, even where the party files a timely 
Rule 5 petition in an appellate court. Clark v. Archer, 2010 UT 57, ^ 14,242 P.3d 
758 ("It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that failure to timely perfect an appeal is a 
jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the appeal/7); see also Utah R. App. P. 
3(a) ("Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a 
notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal/7) (emphasis added). 
1
 The holding in Hicks also was premised on the court of appeals' reasoning that 
orders compelling arbitration are final and therefore directly appealable under 
Utah Constitution article VII section 5, which guarantees an appeal of right in all 
cases. Hicks, 2010 UT App 26, %^ 16-17. The Hicks court concluded that its prior 
decision holding that orders compelling arbitration are directly appealable 
bound it to hold that orders vacating an award and directing a rehearing also are 
directly appealable because such orders are at least as final, for constitutional 
purposes, as orders compelling arbitration. Id. Westgate expresses no opinion 
on the viability of this constitutional analysis and instead calls the court's 
attention to the Hicks court's conclusion that it "unquestionably" had 
jurisdiction over the order in that case by virtue of section 129. Id. f^ 17 n.10; see 
also State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099,1103 (Utah 1985) ("It is a fundamental rule 
that this Court should avoid addressing constitutional issues unless required to 
do so/'). 
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As the court explained in Archer, "[i]t is not unreasonable to require 
attorneys to correctly apply clear and unambiguous procedural rules/' Id. CPG 
attempts to distinguish Archer by asserting that, in this case, CPG's appeal of 
right was not "clear and unambiguous/' (AOB at 16-18.) But CPG fails to cite 
Hicks, which is clear and unambiguous on the point that parties have an appeal 
of right from combined orders such as the one issued by the district court here. 
Moreover, Archer confirms the straightforward implication of Rules 2 and 4(a): 
CPG's failure to file a notice of appeal within 30 days precludes appellate 
jurisdiction. 
As a fallback, CPG argues that its failure to file a notice of appeal in the 
district court should not be dispositive because it filed in this court a Rule 5 
petition to review the order as interlocutory. In support, CPG cites Cedar 
Surgery Ctr., L.L.C. v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58,96 P.3d 911. Bonelli does not support 
CPG's position. Bonelli held that a Rule 5 petition filed in an appellate court, and 
a timely "petition for permission to appeal" filed in the district court satisfied 
the notice of appeal requirements of Rule 3 even though the "notice of appeal" 
filed in the district court was improperly captioned. Id^tf 11-12. Under Rule 2, 
a court may forgive the improper captioning of a timely district court filing. 
Thus, Bonelli does not support CPG's position, as it did not involve a failure to 
make any district court filing under Rule 4(a) — a failure that cannot be forgiven 
under Rule 2. CPG filed nothing in the district court within the 30-day deadline 
specified in Rule 4(a), properly captioned or otherwise. In those circumstances, a 
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Rule 5 petition filed only in an appellate court cannot satisfy Rule 4(a)'s 
requirement that a notice of appeal be filed in the district court within 30 days. 
Clark v.Archer, 2010 UT 57,113,242 P.3d 758. In sum, CPG's failure to file in 
the district court a timely notice of appeal—or an improperly captioned 
equivalent—precludes appellate jurisdiction. 
B. Section 78B-ll-129(l)(c) Grants the Right to Appeal from District 
Court Orders Denying Confirmation of Arbitration Awards 
While CPG has not cited Hicks or argued it should be set aside, CPG has 
raised a number of arguments at odds with the holding in Hicks. For that 
reason, Westgate will address why the holding in Hicks is correct. Utah Code 
section 78B-ll-129(l)(c) expressly provides that parties have an appeal of right 
from orders "denying confirmation of an award/' Hicks held that, because the 
legislature has permitted appeals from certain orders that may not otherwise 
constitute final judgments, including orders denying confirmation of the 
arbitration award —such orders are statutorily appealable regardless of whether 
the order also vacates the award and directs a rehearing. Hicks, 2010 UT App 26, 
Tffi 16-17. The plain language and purpose of the UPUAA confirm that the 
holding of Hicks is correct. 
1. Under the Plain Language of Section 78B-11-129(1), CPG 
Had an Appeal of Right from the District Court's Order 
Section 78B-11-129(1) identifies a number of orders from which parties 
have a statutory appeal of right: " An appeal may be taken from: (a) an order 
denying a motion to compel arbitration; (b) an order granting a motion to stay 
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arbitration; (c) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award; (d) an 
order modifying or correcting an award; (e) an order vacating an award without 
directing a rehearing; or (f) a final judgment entered pursuant to this chapter." 
(emphasis added). This court has held that, by enacting a virtually identical 
provision in a prior version of the UPUAA, which similarly designated certain 
orders as immediately appealable, the legislature "without qualification... 
conferred appellate jurisdiction" over those orders. Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 
54,117, 982 P.2d 572. This court should reaffirm that position here. 
The order CPG attempts to appeal states: "Consumer Protection Group, 
LLC's Combined Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award . . . is DENIED." 
(R. 6157.) The order thus falls squarely under section 78B-ll-129(l)(c)'s plain 
language: "An appeal may be taken from . . . an order . . . denying confirmation 
of an award." CPG would have this court read additional limiting language into 
section 78B-ll-129(l)(c) so that it reads, "An appeal may be taken from an order 
denying confirmation of an award, unless the court also vacates the award and 
directs a rehearing." This reading is inconsistent with the linguistic structure of 
the statute. Section 78B-11-129(1) is a disjunctive list of orders from which a 
party has a statutory right to appeal. Because it is disjunctive, only one such 
order must be entered to trigger the right to appeal. This court should not read a 
limiting qualification into section 78B-ll-129(l)(c). Bissland v. Bankhead, 2007 
UT 86, Tf 9,171 P.3d 430 (plain language interpretation should govern). 
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CPG resists the plain language interpretation by arguing that the order 
was not appealable because it was not final, and it was not final because it 
required a rehearing. (AOB at 14.) But if the list of appealable orders in section 
78B-11-129(1) also required a final judgment, then section 78B-11-129 would be 
entirely superfluous, as final judgments are appealable independent of section 
78B-11-129. Again, there is no need to read a qualification into section 78B-11-
129(1) where none exists. Robinson v. Mount Logan Clinic, 2008 UT 21, f 9,182 
P.3d 333 ("[W]e construe a statute so 'as to render all parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful... / " (quoting Tackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18, f 21, 70 P.3d 78)); Hall 
v. Dep'tofCorr., 2001 UT 34, If 15,24 P.3d 958 ("We . . . avoid interpretations 
that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative/'). 
CPG simply refuses to acknowledge the literal application of section 78B-
ll-129(l)(c) and argues that "[n]one of the bases for appeal listed in § 129 is 
applicable to this matter/7 (AOB at 13.) To reach that conclusion, however, CPG 
ignores that the district court's order denies confirmation of an award and 
focuses only upon the fact that the order also vacates the award and directs a 
rehearing. (Id.) Elsewhere, CPG asserts that the order only "technically" 
resulted in the district court denying CPG's motion to confirm the award as a 
side effect of its granting Westgate's motion. (AOB at 9.) 
CPG's assertions are inconsistent with the procedural history. The initial 
motion filed in the district court was CPG's motion to confirm the award, a stand 
alone motion, to which Westgate responded not only by arguing that the award 
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should not be con firmed but ctlsu b^y mov in" Mie district ^ourt to vacate 'the 
award (R 5764-65; 5893-90^ Tin f*. MIUM'H district court granted Westgate's 
motion does not change llir MI i mm \ i i i "i minim nr i uni in mi lilt" <iv\ nil i I * nil 
dei lied 2 The district court's order "denying confirmation" of the award 
expresslv nrl • ihr order within section 78B-1 1 -1 29(l)(c). 
. : • tic > t: i, KlV II l - L N ( l ) is n ,>l the 
exclusive avenue ior obtaining appellate review, CPG argues that the w ord 
"may" in sei Ii< *n 78B-11-129(1) - ^ n appeal, may be taken" — means that an 
appeal, o l r i • • -*- * 
786-11-129(1 Wii di I J . ) CPG asserts that the use oi tiv- v , ! -i.u \w . -
the door open t^r interlocutory appeal- n~ ^-~n ^his readim; is iliogu. . i* 
w o r d ' . - • • ! ? . . ; v 
listed orders and indicates that parties have the choice of whethtM f, • .: s lv^ 
resources appealing from,, "the orders listed in section 78B-11 -1 29(1). Section 78B-
II II II
 t
H)(l)« onliiii inns IVVsl^alt1' s mlerprpl i i l inn " An i ippd i l niiiv' be Liken f rom a 
final judgment entered pursuant to this chapter/ Id, Under CPG's 
interpretation, a party" could file a Rule 5 petition ii i„  an appellate court to re\ iew 
el (i iki l jiid^fiiniml ii»i iibsui J ie,su ll 
2
 Under the UPUAA, motions to confirm,., may be granted a^ a necessary 
consequence of denying a motion to vacate, but they cannot be "technically 
denied. Under section 78B-11-124(4), where a "court denies a motion to vacate 
an award, it shall confirm the award unless a motion to modify or correct the 
award is pending/' There is no corresponding mandate to deny confirmation if a 
motion to vacate is granted. In any event, 'the issue is beside the point here 
because CPG's stand, alone motion to confirm was denied. 
Ii) 
The plain language of section 78B-11-129(1)(c) provided CPG an appeal of 
right from the combined order denying CPG's motion to confirm and granting 
Westgate's motion to vacate while directing a rehearing. Because CPG had an 
appeal of right, its failure to file a notice of appeal within the 30-day deadline in 
Rule 4(a) precludes appellate jurisdiction. This court should dismiss this appeal. 
Z The Better Reasoned Approach of Other Jurisdictions 
Confirms the Plain Language Interpretation of Section 78B-
11-129(1) 
Although the opening brief does not acknowledge it, among jurisdictions 
with similar language in their arbitration statutes, there is a split of authority 
regarding whether an order that both denies a motion to confirm an award and 
also vacates that award and directs a rehearing is appealable as a matter of right. 
The split of authority was noted in Hicks, but has since been analyzed 
thoroughly by the Texas Supreme Court in East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co. v. 
Werline, 307 S. W.3d 267 (Tex. 2010),^  an opinion that rejects the position 
3
 As Werline notes, "[i]n New York, where there is no statute governing appeals 
in arbitration cases specifically, an appeal would be allowed. One other state, 
West Virginia, has no specific statute. The Uniform Arbitration Act or the 
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act provision regarding appeals has been adopted 
in thirty-four other states and the District of Columbia, and two other states have 
similar provisions. But even in these thirty-seven jurisdictions with similar 
statutory language, the decisions directly addressing this issue fail to reach any 
sort of consensus. Courts in seven states —California, Kentucky, Maine, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina and South Dakota—and in the District of 
Columbia have dismissed appeals from orders similar to the order in this case 
providing both for vacatur and a rehearing. Courts in four states —Arizona, 
Massachusetts, Tennessee and Utah have not. Courts in at least two states— 
Minnesota and Missouri—have gone both ways. Six states have statutes more 
like the [Federal Arbitration Act]. Courts in one of those states —Ohio —appear to 
allow appeals when the federal courts would. Two other states have statutes 
more like the FAA but in limited contexts. Three states have statutes allowing 
20 
,tJvYinn ^ \ % :n ?*« : Werline noted, toadopi tho position advanrod by 
CPG the cow MUS! allow tin- negative implh atio<i »f section 78B-11-1 r M I |(e), 
wi rich allows appeals iro;.. <, . vi • .i-r.? J 
•- <-w -. •'".: pidiii meaning of section 78B-ll-129(r:* ) whirl* allow s 
\\\ i <ils from orders denying confirmation of an a-vnrd without qiMiiiu atior 
o* ;,,;.* M S , , *-- • y 
- 'i <-* ' re i tut lav ored ov ei aii express grant of statutory authority, 
Assoc ~ n. Contrs. v. Bd. of Oil, 2001 17T ^ r « W, 3h i >u2^ ,i v vill 
no *,\;ci u. : 'i1 • • the 
in --n1" Hatioii must be based on tiie ian-VM1**' usc<l, and u » have no poi.\ or to 
rewrite the slalute lo conform to an intention not expressed," | I he U I'll A A's 
unambiguous ^iJiii ol a Mj'.hl In appeal Imm MIMH1 oulors should iiH h" louii/l In 
be extinguished by a ne<M*ivp implication drawn from a separate grant of 
permission to appeal other orders. 
I he e\|"ies«i Linton;;!- cippindi li ol 1,1 w IV'eiluie i uiii I provides * u iris 
flexibility without authorizing needless appeals. As Werline notes, there is no 
statutory right to appeal where a court merer/ requests , |ai WK aaoi»o; m 
.IT I 'iti ctt 1011 an iihi hvau'.i >iii h an H\U i •• * ; -. lotion lining 
confirmation." Werline, 307 S.W. 3d at 270-71. Only where, as here, the order 
appeals in arbitration cases as in other civil cases. Of these, one, Alabama would 
apparently allow an appeal like the one before us. Thus, the seventeen 
jurisdictions, other than Texas, that have considered whether to allow appeal in a 
situation like the one in. this case appear about evenly divided on the issue," 307 
S.W.3d at 272-74 (footnotes om itted). 
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constitutes a full adjudication of the confirmation issue does a court's vacating 
the award go hand-in-hand with an order denying confirmation and trigger a 
party's right to appeal.4 
The plain express language approach to determining which orders are 
appealable also is consistent with Utah policy favoring arbitration and limiting 
the scope of district court review of arbitration awards. Softsolutions, Inc. v. 
Brigham Young Univ., 2000 UT 46, f 14,1 P.3d 1095 ("[G]iven the public policy 
and law in support of arbitration, judicial review of arbitration awards confirmed 
pursuant to the Act is limited to those grounds and procedures provided for 
under the Act."). With no appeal of right from orders denying confirmation, 
district courts might exceed their limited authority. Werline, 307 S.W.3d at 271 
(limitations on substantive review of arbitration awards "would be circumvented 
if [rehearing] could be ordered for [illegitimate] reasons . . . and appeal thereby 
delayed."). The policy in favor of arbitration—providing "expeditious and less 
expensive" methods for dispute resolution—is better served by permitting 
appeals as a matter of right from those orders identified in section 78B-11-129(1). 
Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Svs. Inc., 731 P.2d 475,479 (Utah 1986). 
4
 Under the UPUAA, a court may vacate an award on the ground that the 
arbitrator's refusal to postpone the hearing without cause prejudiced a party. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-ll-124(l)(c). A court could then direct a "rehearing" to 
provide the arbitrator an opportunity to provide an explanation for refusing to 
postpone the hearing. In such circumstances, section 78B-ll-129(l)(e) operates to 
deny an appeal of right. The order would become appealable if, after the 
arbitrator provided an explanation, the district court confirms or refuses to 
confirm the award. 
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' I Jnder CPG's proposed interpretation, the default standard in sim liar 
future cases will be that parties must re-arbitrate claims without first obtaining 
appellate coui'l jeview, even il ilie Jisfriet ronrl en ted IN van iiliiif, ilie award. 
That is , a party who obtains a favorable arbitration award HPJ ei-i ha^ that 
award vacated could be required to wait unt^1 tht reheai n ^  * »J u w <u in , a ho ;c 
complete before ai iappe] late ecu i r tn ia.) rev h ' <• j 
is r iot moot. And even then, the prevailing (fur the second time) party may not 
K abli to ohLtin appellalc review n \m* district court again vacates the awaH 
to mean what it says — 'that a party may appeal from an order denying 
confirmation of an arbitration award — gives the parties the right to p^cnr, . f 
arbitration as an expeditious method for dispute resolution , 
The court should hold that section 78B 1 1 1 29(1) prov ides t:l: te right to 
appeal v 'Ilii;,!ii"\ ij« ii I omul denies roniirmalion oi iiiii iirhilralinn award. That 
interpretation ^ * onsisteni with the statutorv plain language, renders each 
provision in tiidt se*. Uow i^aningt .J , does . *. , iv,ae c\^eptions-by-implicali aii, 
• , • \h ' - i favoring arbitration. CPG had the right to 
appeal bb* i takenlv elected instead to petition for interlocutory review. 
Because CPG did not file a notice oi appeal in iiheilistm u i IIIII 'villi in ilie Mi niayr 
deadline in Ri lie 4(a), this court lacks jurisdiction. This court should dismiss this 
appeal without reaching the merits. 
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II. Should the Court Reach the Merits, It Should Affirm Because Vacatur 
Was the Appropriate Remedy for Arbitrator Burbidge's Nondisclosure 
of His First-Cousin Relationship with Counsel for CPG 
If the court reaches the merits, it should affirm. The district court properly 
concluded that arbitrator Burbidge had an obligation to inform the parties of his 
first-cousin relationship with attorney Burbidge and that his failure to make that 
relationship known to Westgate requires vacatur of the award. The UPUAA sets 
forth two different standards for vacatur relevant to this appeal. Under one 
standard, the court reviewing an arbitration award must vacate the award if a 
neutral arbitrator fails to disclose a "known, existing, and substantial 
relationship with a party/' Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-11-113(5), -124(l)(b)(i). 
Under the second standard, a court has discretion to vacate an award entered by 
an arbitrator who failed to disclose any "existing or past relationship with any of 
the parties to . . . the arbitration proceeding, their counsel or representatives, a 
witness, or another arbitrator." IcL §§ 78B-ll-113(l)(b), -113(4). 
Here, the district court's order can be affirmed under either standard. The 
district court concluded that vacatur was mandatory because arbitrator 
Burbidge's relationship with attorney Burbidge was substantial and, therefore, 
arbitrator Burbidge was statutorily presumed to have acted with partiality. 
Alternatively, even if arbitrator Burbidge's relationship with attorney Burbidge 
was not a "substantial relationship with a party" such that the UPUAA 
mandated vacatur, the district court nevertheless did not abuse its discretion 
when it vacated the award. 
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Before i tddressing th.e two standards for vacatur under "the UPUAA, it is 
important to discuss the critical role that disclosure plays in the process of 
appointing arbitrators Oi il) in light oil llitil 1 u\\ kj ,roi 11 t..ci can ll • 
implications of ' ; -. Iv-iulh "-ueciated. In the follow in jy pa y>e^  Vv.»st£ate 
will show th.s? the UPUAA neutrality and disclosure requirements are , t inni to 
the effectiveness ana mu-^i 
.
 L S C j o s u r e requirements p* * * a critical role in arbitrator 
appointment because arbitrators function as private judicial officers. Yet unlike 
>t<k puio .1. 'Minu jujf;i\- - • rators are ell ra s i i ifr on i tl te legal ai i I 
- ' i nv-rcial communities on a case -by-case basis. And unlike judges, until their 
appointment, arbitrators are not bound by canon s of ethics to be circumspect in 
their relatioi i s i, \ lilt i member: • IIIM1 Ii'jvil *»i [»ir«tfessioi 
preamble to the American Arbitration Association's Cod ^ * ior 
Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes acknowledges thnf fact, stating that 
"[ajrbilrvilois like judges, Iid\ i" 11 it • pmvn In ilivul*1t -IM^ I Invvevei unlike lull 
time judges, arbitrators are usually engaged in oth< *r * * i upahons before, during, 
and atter the time that they serve as arbitrator. ' i he LA)ik- qi 
Arbitrators in Commercial Dispules p rea r ' ' . s o n, 11 i inn 
2UIM)("AAA( anons"). 
It is well known that maintaining impartiality is a challenge because 
p.ittios pick iiihihiitor'i Willi spenali/nl knni vledfy Arbitrators a IT often 
"p iirposely chosen from the same trade or industry as the parties in onler to 
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bring special knowledge to the task of deciding/7 Id. The comments to the 
model Uniform Arbitration Act note that "[t]he problem of arbitrator partiality .. 
. involves a tension between abstract concepts of impartial justice and the notion 
that parties are entitled to a decision maker of their own choosing, including an 
expert with the biases and prejudices inherent in particular worldly experience/' 
Uniform Arbitration Act § 12 cmt. 1 (National Conference of Commissioners of 
Uniform State Laws 2000) ("Model Act"). Thus, arbitrators with relevant 
worldly experience are also likely to have many relationships with individuals in 
their professional community because "[arbitrating parties frequently choose 
arbitrators on the basis of prior professional or business associations, or pertinent 
commercial expertise." Id. Expecting those who might be asked to be arbitrators 
to anticipatorily take on a diminished role in their respective communities is 
unrealistic. Potential arbitrators who sequester themselves might well be less 
likely to be chosen as arbitrators. For these and other reasons, arbitrators, unlike 
judges, are not expected to conduct themselves in a manner that will minirnize 
the risk of potential future conflicts.5 
To account for the potential for conflicts, the UPUAA, like the rules 
promulgated by the AAA, sets forth disclosure requirements. The comment to 
5
 The expectations for judges are sharply different than those for arbitrators. The 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct provides "when engaging in extrajudicial 
activities, a judge shall not participate in activities that will lead to unreasonably 
frequent disqualification of the judge [or] participate in activities that would 
appear to . . . undermine the judge's independence, integrity, or impartiality." 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon III, Rule 3.1 (internal numbering omitted). 
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arbitrator disclosure to party choice and perceptions of fairness , . S A J • >n :' 
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7
 CPG raises "the specter of parties, suffering from,,, "post arbitration 'sour 
grapes/" digging into an arbitrator's past to find, ex post, relationships that 
would justify disqualification. (AOB at 22-23.) This untoward result, CPG 
contends, requires that the Court not permit challenges like the one made here. 
CPG's argument is a red herring—unless the relationship could have been 
discovered through a "reasonable inquiry" and unless the arbitrator knowingly 
failed to disclose the relationship, CPG's "sour grapes" hypothetical would never 
apply. Utah, Code Ann. § 78B-11 -113(1). 
Under the UPUAA, an arbitrator with a "known, existing, and substantial 
relationship with a party may not serve." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(5). 
Given arbitrator Burbidge's relationship to attorney Burbidge, he should not 
have served here. However, under the UPUAA, there is no mechanism for 
enforcing the mandate of section 112(5). Section 78B-11-113(3) specifically notes 
that arbitrators may continue to serve even though a party objects to their 
involvement. Unlike judges, arbitrators are not bound by the canons of judicial 
ethics to disqualify themselves when their impartiality is suspect. Utah Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Canon II, Rule 2.11 ("A judge shall disqualify himself or herself 
in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned "). Indeed, an arbitrator may have an incentive not to disclose 
the existence of potentially biasing relationships because, if a party has the 
arbitrator disqualified, the disclosure of the relationship will have cost the 
arbitrator a job. Thus, imposing consequences for nondisclosure is critically 
important to maintain the integrity of the arbitrator selection process and, 
ultimately, the arbitral institution. 
To this end, the legislature selected vacatur as the appropriate 
consequence for nondisclosure. When an arbitrator—acting as a neutral or not— 
fails to disclose an "existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the . . . 
arbitration proceeding, their counsel or representatives, a witness, or another 
arbitrator," the reviewing court may vacate the award. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
ll-113(l)(b), -113(4). And given the importance of arbitrator neutrality, where an 
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d fli 111'ti lor ail in 1^ , as a nrulivil fail*- In disclasoa "substantial relationship, the 
UFUAA mandates vacatur of the award. Id. § 78B-11-113(5). 
These consequences, while they may appeal I MI si i, dii1 cnili.il In iissuii iii^ , 
fi ill disclosure b 5 ;' poteni ial arbitrators and maintaining 'the integrity of "the 
system of arbitration. Out of respect for 'the parties' choice to submit their 
dispute to a non-judicial decision-make. tiui! ail nti 
expedil i ous ai id flexible 1! 1 te decisions of arbitrators are insulated from judicial 
review u*,. much greater degree1 lhan die llu divisions of di strict courts 8 The 
ground - toi . * ->*ui\ ;ng or vacatu^ .*> 01 ice ei li ered ai e ery 
limite " D-±±-124I l ' ' ' • voluntary disclosure of 
potentially biasing relationships is critical t<»* -nsiring the integrity of the process. 
Model Act, & L!, ifiil 1 (disclosing is •* ' basic lenel .»( |>i"cK **c 11Ji\il 11.111." • lh.it 
"assumes oven greater significance in light oi the strict limits on judicial review 
of arbitration awards/'). 
\ \ lllioul brnaddisclosme iu|mivmoiils ami moanin^tul mm hanisms Im 
enforcing those requirements, parties have no basis for believing that individuals 
» Biizas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah 1996) ("It is 
well settled, both in Utah and in the federal courts, thai the trial court may not 
substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator, nor may it modify or vacate an 
award because it disagrees with the arbitrator's assessment/'); AUred v. 
Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 909 P.2d 1263,1265 (Utah 1996) ("Given the public 
policy and law in support of arbitration, judicial review of arbitration award > 
confirmed pursuant to the Act is limited to those grounds and procedures 
provided for under the Act/7); id. ("'[A]wards will not be disturbed on acco f 
irregularities or informalities, or because the court does not agree with the 
award, so long as the proceeding has been fair and honest and the substantial 
rights of the parties have been respected/" (emphasis added) (quoting Utility 
Trailer Sales v. Fake, 740 P.2d 1327,1329 (Utah 1987))). 
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considered for appointment as arbitrators are acting in the interest of an 
impartial dispute resolution process. With that in mind, Westgate will address 
the two different bases for vacatur that apply in this case. Specifically, Westgate 
will demonstrate that (i) the district court correctly concluded that the UPUAA 
mandates vacatur of an arbitration award when an arbitrator fails to disclose a 
first-cousin relationship with a partner at the firm representing a party to the 
arbitration; and (ii) even if vacatur under the UPUAA were not mandatory, the 
district court's decision to vacate the arbitration award in the circumstances 
presented here was not an abuse of discretion. 
A. The UPUAA Mandates Vacatur of Arbitration Awards When a 
Neutral Arbitrator Fails to Disclose a First-Cousin Relationship 
with Counsel for a Party to the Arbitration Proceeding 
The district court correctly concluded that vacatur is the necessary 
consequence of arbitrator Burbidge's failure to disclose his first-cousin 
relationship with attorney Burbidge. During the arbitration, Burbidge declared 
that he was acting as a neutral. Under the UPUAA, disclosure requirements, 
neutrality requirements, and vacatur standards all operate interdependently to 
safeguard the integrity of arbitration proceedings. That is, unless the parties 
consent to his involvement, an arbitrator is disqualified from serving if he has a 
"known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party/' Id. § 78B-11-112(2). 
Second, if an arbitrator serves without disclosing such a "substantial 
relationship" — as opposed to the "existing or past" relationships that all 
arbitrators must disclose under section 78B-11-113(1) — then the arbitrator acting 
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as a i leiitral is presumed to act w ith "evident partulih M 3 ."bB ! I ; '-(.-). 
Under the U PUA A, when a neutral arbitrator nrts •% tin i-\ tJent partiality, an 
award entered by litat aibitrdloi itiiisf In* \\n ailed Id § 78 U 11 ' "> I' n ' L •' 
("[T]he court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding e 
there was evident partiality bv rm arbitrator appointed n^ a neutra> .*n>.ii'at^  
Though see lie 111 7* : : ; * 1 
i v v " it should be interpreted to include relationships with a party's i. »unseL 
M ?* 78B-11 ^^°(5NF First CVG does not argue hero an J duJ notar^LU , . .. w 
M- (..- - — . • 1 able to theBur^.K?,- • . »• *v>* ^ <: 
icav,iieb oni) di. arbitrator ^ relationships with lite* al parties-in-interest b1 114f UM, 
attorney Burbidge's interests in tlu^ «iij,tiiior warrant seating mm as a party 
yard will be shared 
wxiit counsel 01* a contingent fee basis and the panel will N determmu -\ ' her 
to award more than $1 millioi 1 i n fees d i recti) to counsel, Giv en iiiosr -new . -< 
til! el the reasons lor disclosing a ielalinii,shi| \ ."ifit ,1 party that underlie the 
UPU A A requirements apply equally in the circumstances at hand 
Here, tl le district court correctly vacated the award \, 111 si-i ousii I 
relationship between an arbitrator and counsel is substantial enough that a 
9
 And CPG cannot raise that new argument for the first time in its reply brief. 
Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, If 9,17 P.3d 1122 ("we will not 
consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief7). Regardless, where 
a law firm prosecutes a case under a contingent fee arrangement and the primary 
money judgment issue concerns attorney fees —the $1.2 million in attoniey fees 
award sought by CPG is nearly 20 times the $65,500 compensatory damages 
award — the law firm is a party-in-interest. 
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neutral arbitrator's failure to disclose that relationship gives rise to the 
presumption that the arbitrator acted with partiality. Based on the presumption 
of evident partiality that arose as a result of arbitrator Burbidge's nondisclosure, 
the district court correctly concluded that vacatur was required. In this section, 
Westgate will show that (i) a first-cousin relationship between an arbitrator and 
counsel for a party is substantial within the meaning of the UPUAA; (ii) the 
district court correctly applied to arbitrator Burbidge the standards for neutral 
arbitrators because the arbitrators here designated themselves as neutral; and 
(iii) the presumption of evident partiality arising under the UPUAA mandated 
vacatur in this case. 
1. Familial Relationships Are Substantial Within the Meaning 
of the UPUAA 
The district court correctly concluded that the familial relationship here 
was "substantial" within the meaning of section 78B-11-113(5). The UPUAA 
requires arbitrators acting as neutrals to disclose a "known, existing, and 
substantial relationship with a party." Id. CPG has conceded that the 
relationship between arbitrator Burbidge and attorney Burbidge was "known 
and existing." (AOB at 20 n.5.) Accordingly, the dispute here hinges on whether 
the district court correctly concluded that this relationship is "substantial." 
Although the UPUAA does not define the word "substantial," the AAA Canons 
provide guidance. Those canons were drafted and approved and are 
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?r invipnii both th* ' s\ mm utc American Bar Association,10 which 
' i ; ' i hem . i \i rtn ularly relevant M >urce of guidance for ethical issuer not 
ui, \:tiy adarcibCu > < * i 
1 : •  i i: id by the \ k A A. Canons, (R. 5937.) . . 
Under those canons, arbitrators are expected to disclose"direct or indirect 
financkn v\ > - . : *3 
"existing or past financial, business professional, family, or social 
re: uionships AAA Canons, Cain - . I These include relationships that an 
jr i;a •: . )i i si tip s 
mvoiv ,(io thtrii ianulieb . . . oi then current en plo^ •>?-<: partners, or professional 
o r ' *; jsmess associates " T ' Tin ise disclosure requirements are consistent with 
thi • -
To determine what relationships are legally substantial so that a failure 10 
disclose them can be anticipated to expose an award to vacatur, it is useful fr> 
* « « \ J % I
 3• t . i i , , » ; , , . . \<_±L\ • m u > : s . 
In itb training materials *•** arbitrators, the AAA ^ K . ateeones of relationships 
the nondisclosure of whid i ha\ e led to vacatur , a list which includes second 
coi isiiis: 
10
 Introduction to the AAA Canons ("The Code of Eth ics for Arbitrators , . . was 
originally prepared in 1977 by a joint committee consisting of a special 
committee of the American Arbitration Association and a special committee of 
the American Bar Association. The Code was revised in 2003 by an ABA Task 
force and special committee of the A AA."). Both the original 1.977 code and the 
2003 Revision have been approved and recom mended by both organizations, 
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1. Present or recent attorney-client relationship; 
2. Relationship of consanguinity within sixfthl degree (e.g. second 
cousins); 
3. Business dealings which are significant, ongoing, or regularly 
conducted; 
4. Close social relationships or friendships; 
5. Arbitrator had a case in which the arbitrator was a party or counsel 
before one who is now a party or counsel. 
Fundamentals of the Arbitration Process: Manual for Commercial Arbitrators 137 
(American Arbitration Association 2000) (emphasis added). While Westgate 
recognizes the difficulty of drawing bright lines in this area, the enumeration of 
relationships by the AAA is helpful to parties to arbitrations and to potential 
arbitrators. It creates a meaningful distinction between mere "existing" 
relationships—the nondisclosure of which does not give rise to a presumption of 
partiality—and "substantial" relationships, which lead to such a presumption. It 
provides guidance to arbitrators acting pursuant to the UPUAA. In this 
particular case, looking to the AAA list gives effect to the arbitrators' decision to 
be bound by the AAA Canons. 
In challenging the district court's decision, CPG contends that the 
relationship was not substantial because it was not similar to the sort of close 
personal relationship that would lead to disqualification of a judge. (AOB at 21.) 
The comparison is inappropriate. As discussed, the standards for disqualifying 
impartial judicial officers and the standards for requiring pre-appointment 
disclosures from potential arbitrators serve entirely different purposes and are 
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assi Dciat ed w n 111 «i 111II1 re I y different remedial mechanisms A better analogy lies * n 
the comparison between arbitrators and jurors both of n horn are members of the 
general pun, , « . * \ - . • 
mlj'idicators, |urors are often dismissed for relationships like the one at issue in 
thiscase/u Utah R. Civ V r(()(?) H a h R r~r- " ^ e ) ( 3 ) . 
CI >G next argues 5 • 1 ; • m i l 11 1 \ * 11 I »< M • 1111 s, i d e n H i 
"substantial" because in De Von; v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 884 P 2d 1 24.6,1253-55 
:. M'I 1*^ 94), i h ^ o u r t dt-i ';ru-d to adopt the rule that a iauui\ u di^clo^ea 
. .1.0. . s n i p 'M • * • • ! • . • . •-
a w a r c j ^ v a c a t e c | u n c | e r foe then-current arbitration statute. CPG contends the 
first-ci>jsin relationship her.? a! most creates only an appearance of impropriety. 
; * •> .. ••;!,' • ;? i_.ii. _\: *-K ,. py/'/Jiiij * .r then iirlilnl 
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arbiti'c ^ KVir. i- 1 • -. • i , 
bcxicvc that a neutral arbitrator S[K-\ tMI partialis r t,u N t k r uould suggest 
conduct that "prejudiced >'.< rights ot [aj pan, .*. * .. ;. ,..;* u< • nl 
11
 State v. Davis, 10 P.3d 977,1010-11 (Wash. 2000) (challenge for cause 
appropriate when the juror is related within four degrees of consanguinity to a 
party); Idaho R. Civ. P. 47(h) (challenge for cause appropriate when tin junv ^ 
related within four degrees of consanguinity or affinity to a party); Gra\ v. 
Commonwealth, 311 S.E.2d409,410 (Va. 1984) (explaining the absolut^u!* 
a potential juror is disqualified if related within the ninth degree of 
consanguinity or affinity to a party); Wilmore v. State, 602 S.E.2d 343,345 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2004) (jurors are often disqualified if they "are related by consanguinity 
or affinity to any party interested in the result of the case or matter wit: 1 1 1,1 tl , 
sixth degree"). 
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version of the UPUAA, "existing or past" relationships with a party's counsel are 
deemed to satisfy that standard. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-ll-113(l)(b) ("facts that a 
reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the 
arbitrator... includ[e]... an existing or past relationship" (internal numbering 
omitted)). If anything, the legislature's choice to classify existing or past 
relationships as the sort of facts that would lead to vacatur under DeVore 
supports the conclusion that vacatur is appropriate here. 
Not only does DeVore's substantive discussion not support CPG, but its 
facts presented a far less compelling case for vacatur than the facts of this case. 
In DeVore, the court considered whether an arbitrator should have disclosed a 
fact unknown until the matter was well underway—that, more than ten years 
before the arbitration, the arbitrator had a church-based relationship with a man 
who was tangentially involved with a party to the arbitration. Id. at 1257. The 
tangentially involved individual was not a witness, a party, or counsel, or an 
employee or agent of either party. Id. at 1250. In fact, he had nothing to do with 
the dispute in question and no interest in its outcome. Id. The same cannot be 
said here—arbitrator Burbidge and attorney Burbidge are first cousins, and 
always will be. Attorney Burbidge, through his firm, is a representative of CPG, 
and a favorable award here will benefit attorney Burbidge because attorney fees 
are paid directly to his firm, as is a portion of the underlying award on which the 
attorney fees are premised. In short, DeVore does not support CPG's position 
legally or factually. 
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CPG is also incorrect that a first-cousin relationship is not substantial. 
That conclusion is inconsistent with the UPUAA, the structures it puts in place 
for ensuring the integrity of the arbitration process, and the ethical standards the 
arbitrators here adopted for themselves. 
2. The District Court Correctly Found That Arbitrator 
Burbidge Acted as a Neutral 
An arbitrator who designates himself as neutral is bound under the 
UPUAA to act as a neutral. Again, the AAA Canons provide useful guidance. 
Those rules acknowledge that arbitration panels may legitimately be neutral or 
non-neutral. Sometimes "parties . . . may prefer that party-appointed arbitrators 
be non-neutral and governed by special ethical considerations/7 AAA Canons, 
preamble. But unless the parties so expressly elect, the Canons express a 
preference for neutrality: "[I]t is preferable for all arbitrators including any party-
appointed arbitrators to be neutral/' Id. The AAA Canons, therefore, 
"establish[] a presumption of neutrality for all arbitrators, including party-
appointed arbitrators, which applies unless the parties' agreement, the 
arbitration rules agreed to by the parties or applicable laws provide otherwise." 
Id. Thus, even party-appointed arbitrators may be bound to follow the ethical 
rules for neutral arbitrators. 
CPG concedes that the arbitrators designated themselves as neutral but 
argues that the arbitrators were powerless, post-appointment, to modify their 
party-appointment status. (AOB at 26-27.) Under the AAA Canons that is 
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incorrect. The Canons presume party-appointed arbitrators will designate 
themselves as neutrals. The fact that CPG selected arbitrator Burbidge is not 
determinative of his neutral or non-neutral status; the express designation by all 
three arbitrators as neutrals is determinative. CPG's contention that "no party 
could reasonably claim" otherwise is inaccurate. (AOB at 27.) 
CPG also argues that the arbitrators, in fact, acted as non-neutral 
arbitrators. (Id.) CPG seeks to have it both ways. On the one hand, CPG 
attempts to reassure the court that the award here was legitimate by stating that 
the "appointees in this matter acted in an objective, professional manner 
throughout the arbitration." (Id.) On the other hand, CPG calls the court's 
attention to the fact that arbitrator Billings (Westgate's party-appointed 
arbitrator) received ex parte communications from Westgate as indicative of her 
non-neutrality. (Id.) CPG's waffling illustrates exactly the reason why 
disclosure requirements are so important—when relevant information is not 
disclosed, after-the-fact reassurances, such as attorney Burbidge's assertion that 
his relationship with arbitrator Burbidge was not a close one, are inadequate to 
ensure the integrity of the process. The declaration of neutrality sets the 
standard by which the arbitrator disclosures are to be judged, it does not obviate 
the need for full disclosure. Further, if CPG in fact believes that arbitrator 
Billings violated her obligations as a neutral arbitrator, such violation would 
provide support for vacating the award, assuming CPG could make out the 
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violation and had sought such a ruling.12 Nothing in the UPUAA suggests that 
multiple errors lend integrity to an arbitration award. 
The arbitrators7 choice to designate themselves as neutrals was binding 
and the presumption that arises under section 78B-11-113(5) for neutral 
arbitrators who do not make full disclosure applied to arbitrator Burbidge. 
3. Vacatur of the Award Was a Mandatory Consequence of 
Arbitrator Burbidge's Nondisclosure 
The district court correctly concluded that the presumption of evident 
partiality that arose as a result of arbitrator Burbidge's nondisclosure mandated 
vacatur in this case. As discussed, when an arbitrator acting as a neutral fails to 
disclose a substantial relationship under section 78B-11-113(5), the arbitrator is 
presumed to have acted with evident partiality. And under section 78B-11-
124(1) (b), when there is evident partiality by a party designated as a neutral, the 
"court shall vacate" the arbitration award. These two provisions, acting in 
tandem, mandate that the award in this case be vacated. 
12
 CPG's claim that arbitrator Billings violated her ethical obligations also cannot 
be sustained. The arbitrators7 self-designation as neutrals occurred in March, 
2009. (R. 6013-14.) But the allegedly improper communication—which consisted 
of Westgate forwarding parts of the district court record to arbitrator Billings — 
happened in late January or early February of that year, before the third 
arbitrator was selected and before the arbitrators had reached a decision on how 
they would arbitrate the case. (R. 5924.) Further, under the AAA Canons, the 
obligation of a neutral arbitrator who receives ex parte communications is to 
cause the information to be sent to the other parties. AAA Canons, Canon III(C). 
Here, arbitrator Billings informed arbitrator Burbidge of the communications, 
which prompted counsel for Westgate to forward the documents to the other 
arbitrators. (R. 5923.) This is entirely consistent with the ethical obligation of a 
neutral arbitrator. 
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CPG argues that, at least in this case, vacatur was not mandatory because 
the presumption of partiality was effectively rebutted. The sole basis for that 
rebuttal was an affidavit filed by attorney Burbidge attesting that his relationship 
with his cousin was not particularly close. (AOB at 24.) Such a self-serving 
declaration is hardly evident of arbitrator Burbidge's state of mind. CPG's 
argument that vacatur was not mandatory fails because it ignores the plain 
language of the relevant provisions of the UPUAA and Utah precedent 
concerning the standard for vacating arbitration awards. 
To reconcile the various provisions of the UPUAA, vacatur is mandatory 
once the presumption of evident partiality applies. The distinction between the 
words "may" and "shall" in the UPUAA suggests this result. Specifically, the 
Utah Legislature has used the word "may" in some provisions of the UPUAA to 
signal that vacatur is not mandatory. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(4). And the 
Utah Legislature has used the word "shall" to signal that vacatur is mandatory 
where an arbitrator designated as a neutral acts with "evident partiality." Id. 
§ 7B-ll-124(l)(b)(i). 
Had the legislature intended the vacatur to be discretionary when the 
presumption applies, then it would have used a discretionary "may" rather than 
"shall." It did not. Due South, Inc. v. Dep't of Alcoholic Bev. Control 2008 UT 
71, f 33,197 P.3d 82 ("Our principles of statutory construction direct us to 
'assume that the legislature used each term in the statute advisedly' and to 
'interpret statutes to give meaning to all parts, and avoid rendering portions of 
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the statute superfluous/" (quoting Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 
257,259 (Utah 1998); LKL Assocs., Inc. v. Farley, 2004 UT 51, f 7,94 P.3d 279). 
Moreover, the type of evidence provided by CPG is legally and factually 
insufficient to rebut that presumption. The presumption at issue is a 
presumption that the arbitrator "actjed] with evident partiality." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-11-113(5). But the affidavit filed by attorney Burbidge addresses a 
different question—whether the cousins' relationship was substantial. It wholly 
fails to address whether partiality motivated arbitrator Burbidge's actions. (AOB 
at 8.) CPG provided no evidence addressing arbitrator Burbidge's motives in not 
making a required disclosure or in making a merits determination. Rather, 
attorney Burbidge sought to undermine the substantiality of the relationship by 
stating that the cousins rarely see each other and interact infrequently. It was not 
the substantiality of the first-cousin relationship that was presumed under the 
statute. As the district court noted, "[t]he first cousin relationship is an 
uncontroverted fact." (R. 6134.) What CPG needed to rebut, but did not address, 
was whether arbitrator Burbidge acted impartially. 
The difficultly of showing actual bias after the fact and the few grounds 
available for courts entertaining challenges to arbitration awards all demonstrate 
why the UPUAA and the relevant ethical rules for arbitrators support full pre-
appointment disclosure.13 And to create the appropriate incentive for full 
13
 As this court stated in DeVore, actual bias may be impossible to prove and 
invites a spectacle that, on the whole, would do more harm than good to the 
integrity of the arbitration process: 
41 
disclosure, breaches of the duty to disclose must be penalized by vacatur of an 
award rendered by a nondisclosing arbitrator. 
In sum, the district court properly vacated the award as a remedy for 
arbitrator Burbidge's nondisclosure. The UPUAA establishes mandatory vacatur 
as the consequence for a neutral arbitrator's failure to disclose a substantial 
relationship with a party. CPG's arguments attempting to defeat the district 
court's determination that a first-cousin relationship is substantial, and the 
determination that the party-appointed arbitrators were neutrals, are contrary to 
the standards controlling arbitration proceedings. 
B. Alternatively, the District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 
Vacating the Award In this Case 
Even if this court concludes that the district court erred in ruling that 
evident partiality was presumed and that vacatur was mandatory under section 
78B-11-113(5), the court should affirm on the alternative ground that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the award under section 78B-11-
113(4). Wholly apart from section 78B-ll-113(5)/s requirement to disclose 
[W]e cannot countenance the promulgation of a 
standard for partiality as insurmountable as 'proof of 
actual bias' Bias is always difficult, and indeed 
often impossible, to 'prove.' Unless an arbitrator 
publicly announces his partiality, or is overhead in a 
moment of private admission, it is difficult to imagine 
how 'proof would be obtained. Such a standard, we 
fear, occasionally would require that we enforce awards 
that are clearly repugnant to our sense of fairness, yet 
do not yield 'proof of anything. 
DeVore, 884 P.2d at 1255-56 (alteration in original) (quoting Morelite Const. 
Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79,84 (2d Cir. 
1984)). 
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substantial relationship or trigger a mandatory vacatur, section 78B-11-113(1) 
requires disclosure by all prospective arbitrators of "any known facts that a 
reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the 
arbitrator/7 including expressly "an existing or past relationship with any of the 
parties . . . to the arbitration proceeding, their counsel or representatives, a 
witness, or another arbitrator." Id § 78B-ll-113(l)(b). Thus, even if the first-
cousin relationship at issue is not a "substantial relationship with a party" under 
section 78B-11-113(5), it still should have been disclosed. And whenever 
required information is not disclosed as required under section 78B-11-113(1), a 
court reviewing an arbitration award "may vacate an award." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-11-113(4). Because arbitrator Burbidge failed to disclose an "existing or 
past" relationship with CPG's counsel, the district court had discretion to vacate 
the award. Id §§ 78B-ll-113(l)(b), -113(4). 
CPG concedes that courts reviewing arbitration awards under the UPUAA 
have this discretionary authority, stating that "failure to disclose under § 78B-11-
113(1) leaves vacatur to the court's discretion." (AOB at 29.) Nevertheless, CPG 
argues, the district court's right to exercise its discretion was never triggered in 
this case because the UPUAA does not require any disclosure of the Burbidges' 
relationship. CPG contends that "[t]he statute places the duty to evaluate all the 
facts surrounding the situation on 'an arbitrator, after making a reasonable 
inquiry/" (AOB at 30.) On CPG's reading, the arbitrator is required to disclose 
the relationship only if, after evaluating for himself "all the facts associated with 
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[the] connection/' the arbitrator concludes the relationship meets the statutory 
standard for disclosure. (Id.) CPG's argument turns the relevant statutory 
language, and the purpose of disclosure, on its head. 
The relevant UPUAA provision regarding disclosure states that an 
arbitrator "after making a reasonable inquiry, shall disclose . . . any known facts 
that a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the 
arbitrator... including... an existing or past relationship with any of the parties 
to . . . the arbitration proceeding [or ] their counsel/7 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-
113(1). That lcinguage is mandatory and inclusive, and it provides district courts 
nearly complete discretion to determine whether an existing relationship must be 
disclosed. The "reasonable inquiry" required of this section excuses the 
arbitrator from having to disclose facts that limits what the arbitrator might be 
expected to know, but it does not allow the arbitrator to withhold facts known to 
him. Once the arbitrator makes the "reasonable inquiry/' he "shall disclose" the 
facts of the relationship. 
CPG's reading of this statute fails to account for related statutory 
provisions and for the purpose underlying mandatory disclosure prior to 
selection of an arbitrator. The UPUAA disclosure requirements are broad, 
designed to enable the parties to meaningfully consider, and meaningfully object 
to, an arbitrator's involvement. For example, section 78B-11-113(3) contemplates 
that arbitrators will disclose information so that parties may object to arbitrators 
based on the information disclosed. An arbitrator who serves despite a party's 
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objection does so knowing he risks the possibility that any award he enters will 
later be vacated. The party appointing that arbitrator is also aware of that risk. 
And, of course, under section 78B-11-113(4), if the arbitrator fails to disclose his 
relationships, he risks the possibility of vacatur. These mechanisms cannot 
function if the statute is construed to give the arbitrator the discretion to choose 
whether to withhold information known to him about an existing relationship. 
Section 78B-ll-113(l)(b) required arbitrator Burbidge to disclose his "existing" 
relationship with attorney Burbidge, a member of the firm which is "counsel" for 
a party. Violation of that requirement gave the district court discretion to vacate 
the award under subsection 113(4). 
CPG offers no persuasive argument as to why the district court should be 
held to have abused its discretion. CPG simply argues that the district court 
abused its discretion because attorney Burbidge's affidavit showed that the 
cousins were not close and, therefore, "it would have been an abuse of discretion 
for the district court to vacate the award under the standard applicable to party 
appointees." (AOB at 30.) That reasoning is unsound. While the presumption of 
partiality applies only to arbitrators acting as neutrals, the broader disclosure 
requirements of section 78B-ll-113(l)(b) apply to all arbitrators. Even if 
arbitrator Burbidge was, by virtue of his party-appointment, not neutral, he was 
still bound by the section 78B-ll-113(l)(b) disclosure requirements. 
Finally, the district court's exercise of its discretion should be upheld, for 
all of the reasons discussed above. The first-cousin relationship between 
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arbitrator Burbidge and a shareholder at Christensen & Jensen was substantial 
and it was certainly a fact a reasonable person would consider was likely to affect 
arbitrator Burbidge's partiality. At the very least, the district court acted within 
its discretion when it found the relationship to qualify as one that triggered the 
statute's mandatory disclosure provision. Attorney Burbidge will benefit from 
the recovery of any award by virtue of a contingency fee arrangement and any 
award of attorney fees. As a result of arbitrator Burbidge's nondisclosure, 
Westgate lost its ability to object to arbitrator Burbidge's appointment. A 
lynchpin of the process established by the UPUAA is giving the parties the right 
and the information needed to weigh the interests of potential arbitrators and 
their relationships to the parties and the subject of the dispute. If disclosure 
requirements are not enforced, those requirements are meaningless and the 
provisions for objecting to arbitrator appointment are hollow. Where a 
relationship like the one in this case is not disclosed, vacatur is within the sound 
discretion of the district court. This court should affirm. 
III. Westgate Did Not Waive Its Right to Seek Vacatur 
Westgate did not waive its right to move for vacatur of the arbitration 
award. Westgate timely filed its motion to vacate after learning of arbitrator 
Burbidge's nondisclosure and well within the statutory ninety-day time frame 
for moving to vacate an award. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124(2). Despite the 
district court's finding that Westgate timely filed its motion to vacate the award, 
CPG argues that Westgate is foreclosed from challenging the award on the basis 
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of arbitrator Burbidge's relationship with counsel for CPG. These arguments rest 
on two premises. First, CPG claims that Westgate should have divined the 
existence of the relationship between Christensen & Jensen and arbitrator 
Burbidge because Westgate must have seen the Burbidge family name on 
Christensen & Jensen's letterhead. (AOB at 33-34.) Second, CPG claims that 
Westgate is therefore barred by the doctrine of waiver from objecting to 
arbitrator Burbidge's role here because Westgate failed to object within a 
reasonable time after it should have become aware of that relationship. (AOB at 
34.) CPG's arguments are legally and factually incorrect. 
First, CPG ignores several provisions of the UPUAA. The UPUAA places 
the responsibility for inquiring into the arbitrator's relationships on the 
arbitrator, not the parties. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(1) (The arbitrator must 
disclose all relevant relationships "after making a reasonable inquiry/'). Further, 
the UPUAA expects the arbitrator to remain vigilant about these relationships 
and imposes an ongoing duty of disclosure. Id. § 78B-11-113(2). And the 
UPUAA contemplates that parties might learn of relevant relationships after the 
arbitration award is entered, even though they are never disclosed by the 
arbitrator. That explains the provision for vacatur when an arbitrator fails to 
disclose relevant relationships. It also explains a party's right to move for 
vacatur for up to ninety days from the entry of an arbitration award. Id, §§ 78B-
11-113(4), -124(2). Westgate reasonably relied on arbitrator Burbidge's 
nondisclosure as an affirmative representation that no relationship required to be 
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disclosed existed. Westgate should not be penalized for failing to second guess 
the arbitrator's diligence. The elements necessary for waiver—an existing right, 
knowledge of its existence, and a distinctly made relinquishment of that right— 
are not present.14 Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 
938 (Utah 1993). 
Second, CPG's factual contention—that counsel for Westgate should have 
been able to piece together the conflict in this case because the Burbidge name 
appeared on the Christensen & Jensen letterhead—is belied by CPG's own 
arguments. After all, CPG claims that the Burbidge name in Utah is the 
functional equivalent of the 'Smith' family name in other places and that it 
would "be hard to find a law firm in town that does not have a Christensen, 
Jensen, Snow, Burbidge, etc/7 (AOB at 21.) Assuming that is true, then it was 
perfectly reasonable for Westgate not to undertake additional inquiry into the 
potential existence of a relevant relationship, as arbitrator Burbidge and 
Christensen & Jensen both knew of, and should have disclosed, any such 
relationship. In other words, if the name is so common, then Westgate would 
14
 CPG also contends that no remand is necessary on this issue because its 
argument is based on largely undisputed facts. (AOB at 32.) This is also 
inaccurate. This court's precedent makes clear that "a fact finder should assess 
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the relinquishment is 
clearly intended." Soter's, 857 P.2d at 941. Here, the district court made no such 
findings regarding Westgate's intent to relinquish its rights or whether Westgate 
reasonably could have known of arbitrator Burbidge's relationship with attorney 
Burbidge before Westgate, in fact, raised the issue. (R. 6134.) Of course, in 
rejecting CPG's waiver argument, the district court impliedly found that the facts 
necessary to support waiver are not present here. But should this court conclude 
that the district court erred, the court nevertheless should remand for factual 
findings regarding the issue of waiver. 
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have no reason to know an actual family relationship existed here. The district 
court was correct in rejecting CPG's arguments regarding waiver. 
IV. Request for Attorney Fees 
If this court dismisses CPG's appeal for lack of jurisdiction or affirms the 
district court's order, Westgate requests that the court award Westgate, as the 
prevailing party, reasonable attorney fees and other litigation expenses under 
Utah Code section 78B-11-126. 
DATED this 19th day of August, 2011. 
Zimmerman Jones Booher L.L.C. 
Troy L. Boohe/ 
Attorneys for Appellee Westgate Resorts, Ltd. 
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This matter is before the Court on petition for interlocutory appeal filed 
on December 22,2010. The petition is provisionally granted. In connection with 
briefing on the merits, the parties are requested to address the following 
threshold issues: (1) whether the order from which the petition is brought is 
subject to direct appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129 or otherwise 
constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal; and (2) whether this Court 
has jurisdiction to review the order pursuant to rule 5 of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Chapter 11. Utah Uniform Arbitration Act (Refs &Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-11-113 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-3^-113 
§ 78B-11-113. Disclosure by arbitrator 
CuiTentness 
(1) Before accepting appointment, an individual who is requested to serve as an arbitrator, after making a reasonable inquiry, 
shall disclose to all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration proceeding and to any other arbitrators any known facts 
that a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of die arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, including: 
(a) a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; and 
(b) an existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the agreement to arbitrate or the arbitration proceeding, their 
counsel or representatives, a witness, or another arbitrator. 
(2) An arbitrator has a continuing obligation to disclose to all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration proceeding 
and to any other arbitrators any facts that the arbitrator learns after accepting appointment which a reasonable person would 
consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator. 
(3) If an arbitrator discloses a fact required by Subsection (1) or (2) to be disclosed and a party timely objects to the 
appointment or continued service of the arbitrator based upon the fact disclosed, the objection may be a ground under Subsection 
78B-11 -124(l)(b) for vacating an award made by the arbitrator. 
(4) If the arbitrator did not disclose a fact as required by Subsection (1) or (2), upon timely objection by a party, the court under 
Subsection 78B-ll-124(l)(b) may vacate an award. 
(5) An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator who does not disclose a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome 
of the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party is presumed to act with evident 
partiality under Subsection 78B-1 l-124(l)(b). 
(6) If the parties to an arbitration proceeding agree to the procedures of an arbitration organization or any other procedures for 
challenges to arbitrators before an award is made, substantial compliance with those procedures is a condition precedent to a 
motion to vacate an award on that ground under Subsection 78B-1 l-124(l)(b). 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1207, eff. Feb. 7,2008. 
Current through 2011 General Session and First Special Session 
End of Document <£' 20JI Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Chapter 11. Utah Uniform Arbitration Act (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-11-124 
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-3ia-l24 
§ 78B-11-124. Vacating an award 
Currentness 
(1) Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration 
proceeding if: 
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; 
(b) there was: 
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator; 
(ii) corruption by an arbitrator; or 
(hi) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; 
(c) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider 
evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78B-11-116, so as to 
substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; 
(d) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority; 
(e) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbitration proceeding without raising an objection 
under Subsection 78B-11-116(3) not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or 
(f) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an arbitration as required in Section 78B-11-110 
so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding. 
(2) A motion under this section must be filed within 90 days after the movant receives notice of the award pursuant to Section 
78B-11-120 or within 90 days after the movant receives notice of amodified or corrected award pursuant to Section 78B-11-121, 
unless the movant alleges that the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means, in which case the motion must 
be made within 90 days after the ground is known or by the exercise of reasonable care would have been known by the movant. 
(3) If the court vacates an award on a ground other than that set forth in Subsection (l)(e), it may order a rehearing. If the 
award is vacated on a ground stated in Subsection (l)(a) or (b), the rehearing must be before a new arbitrator. If the award 
is vacated on a ground stated in Subsection (l)(c), (d), or (f), the rehearing may be before the arbitrator who made the award 
or the arbitrator's successor. The arbitrator must render the decision in the rehearing within the same time as that provided in 
Subsection 78B-11-120(2) for an award. 
(4) If the court denies a motion to vacate an award, it shall confirm the award unless a motion to modify or correct the award 
is pending. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Chapter 11. Utah Unifonn Arbitration Act (Refs &Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-11-126 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-3^-126 
§ 78B-11-126. Judgment on award—Attorney fees and litigation expenses 
Currentness 
(1) Upon granting an order confirming, vacating without directing a rehearing, modifying, or correcting an award, the court 
shall enter a judgment conforming to the award. The judgment may be recorded, docketed, and enforced as any other judgment 
in a civil action. 
(2) A court may allow reasonable costs of the motion and subsequent judicial proceedings. 
(3) On application of a prevailing party to a contested judicial proceeding under Section 78B-11-123, 78B-11-124, or 
78B-11-125, the court may add reasonable attorney fees and other reasonable expenses of litigation incurred in a judicial 
proceeding after the award is made to a judgment confirming, vacating without directing a rehearing, modifying, or correcting 
an award. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1220, eff. Feb. 7,2008. 
Notes of Decisions (12) 
Current through 2011 General Session and First Special Session 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Chapter 11. Utah Uniform Arbitration Act (Refs &Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-11-129 
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-3^-129 
§ 78B-11-129. Appeals 
Currentness 
(1) An appeal may be taken from: 
(a) an order denying a motion to compel arbitration; 
(b) an order granting a motion to stay arbitration; 
(c) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award; 
(d) an order modifying or correcting an award; 
(e) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or 
(f) a final judgment entered pursuant to this chapter. 
(2) An appeal under this section must be taken as from an order or a judgment in a civil action. 
Credits 
Laws 2008,c. 3, § 1223, eff.Feb. 7,2008. 
Notes of Decisions (9) 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
Title I. Applicability of Rules 
Rules App.Proc, Rule 2 
RULE 2. SUSPENSION OF RULES 
Currentness 
In the interest of expediting a decision, the appellate court, on its own motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may, except 
as to the provisions of Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), 48,52, and 59, suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules 
in a particular case and may order proceedings in that case in accordance with its direction. 
Credits 
[Emergency amendment effective May 3,2004.] 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
Title II. Appeals from Judgments and Orders of Trial Courts 
Rules App.Proc, Rule 3 
RULE 3. APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: HOW TAKEN 
Currentness 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a district or juvenile court to the appellate 
court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a 
notice of appeal with the clerk of die trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step 
other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action 
as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as 
well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to appeal from a judgment or order and their interests 
are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after 
filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals 
maty be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the 
parties to the separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. 
The title of the action or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by 
the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as 
the petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the 
judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is taken; and shall designate 
the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving 
personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented 
by counsel, then on the party at the party's last known address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the 
notice of appeal. If counsel of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate the name of the party represented by 
that counsel. 
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking 
the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court the filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial court shall not accept 
a notice of appeal regardless of whether the filing fee has been paid. Failure to pay the filing fee within a reasonable time may 
result in dismissal. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal , the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit a 
certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a statement by the clerk indicating whether the filing 
fee was paid and whether the cost bond required by Rule 6 was filed. Upon receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal, the clerk 
of the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action 
in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such name 
shall be added to the tide. 
Credits 
[Amended effective October 1,1992; November 1,1996; November 1,1999; November 1,2008.] 
Wests Utah Code Annotated 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
Title II. Appeals from Judgments and Orders of Trial Courts 
Rules App.Proc., Rule 4 
RULE 4. APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: WHEN TAKEN 
Currentness 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court 
to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after 
the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 
10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions. 
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the time for all parties to appeal from the judgment 
runs from the entry of the order disposing of the motion: 
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required 
if the motion is granted, under Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; or 
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry of an order disposing of any motion 
listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry of the order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice of appeal is 
effective to appeal only from the underlying judgment. To appeal from a final order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), a 
party must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of appeal within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or 
order but before entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal 
within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraphs 
(a) and (b) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for 
filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraphs (a) 
and (b) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise 
requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with 
the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of 
entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
(f) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in criminal cases. Upon a showing that a criminal defendant was 
deprived of the right to appeal, the trial court shall reinstate the thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal. A defendant seeking 
such reinstatement shall file a written motion in the sentencing court and serve the prosecuting entity. If the defendant is not 
represented and is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel. The prosecutor shall have 30 days after service of the motion to 
file a written response. If the prosecutor opposes the motion, the trial court shall set a hearing at which the parties may present 
evidence. If the trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has demonstrated that he was deprived 
of his right to appeal, it shall enter an order reinstating the time for appeal. The defendant's notice of appeal must be filed with 
the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the order. 
(g) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined in an institution files a notice of appeal in either a 
civil or criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the 
last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit 
and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in the manner provided in this paragraph (g), 
the 14-day period provided in paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice of appeal. 
Credits 
[Amended effective November 1,1998; April 1,1999; November 1,2002; November 1,2005; November 1,2006.] 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
Title II. Appeals from Judgments and Orders of Trial Courts 
Rules App.Proc, Rule 5 
RULE 5. DISCRETIONARY APPEALS FROM INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS 
Currentness 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be sought by any party by filing a petition 
for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the case within 
20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court, with proof of service on all other parties to the action. A timely appeal from 
an order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the appellate court determines is not final may, in the 
discretion of the appellate court, be considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order. 
The appellate court may direct the appellant to file a petition that conforms to the requirements of paragraph (c) of this rule. 
(b) Fees and copies of petition. For a petition presented to the Supreme Court, the petitioner shall file with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court an original and five copies of the petition, together with the fee required by statute. For a petition presented to 
the Court of Appeals, the petitioner shall file with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals an original and four copies of the petition, 
together with the fee required by statute. The petitioner shall serve the petition on the opposing party and notice of the filing 
of the petition on the trial court. If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall immediately 
give notice of the order by mail to the respective parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the order, together with a copy 
of the petition, to the trial court where the petition and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of appeal. 
(c) Content of petition. 
(c)(1) The petition shall contain: 
(c)(1)(A) A concise statement of facts material to a consideration of the issue presented and the order sought to be reviewed; 
(c)(1)(B) The issue presented expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail, and a 
demonstration that the issue was preserved in the trial court. Petitioner must state the applicable standard of appellate review 
and cite supporting authority; 
(c)(1)(C) A statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory appeal should be permitted, including a concise analysis 
of the statutes, rules or cases believed to be determinative of the issue stated; and 
(c)(1)(D) A statement of the reason why the appeal may materially advance the termination of the litigation. 
(c)(2) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals, the phrase "Subject to assignment to 
the Court of Appeals" shall appear immediately under the tide of the document, i.e. Petition for Permission to Appeal. Appellant 
may then set forth in the petition a concise statement why the Supreme Court should decide the case in light of the relevant 
factors listed in Rule 9(c)(9). 
(c)(3) The petitioner shall attach a copy of the order of the trial court from which an appeal is sought and any related findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and opinion. 
(d) Service in criminal and juvenile delinquency cases. Any petition filed by a defendant in a criminal case originally charged 
as a felony or by a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding shall be served on the Criminal Appeals Division of the Office of 
the Utah Attorney General. 
(e) Answer. Within 10 days after service of the petition, any other party may file an answer in opposition or concurrence. If 
the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals, the answer may contain a concise response 
to the petitioner's contentions under Rule 5(c). An original and five copies of the answer shall be filed in the Supreme Court. 
An original and four copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. The respondent shall serve the answer on the petitioner. The 
petition and any answer shall be submitted without oral argument unless otherwise ordered. 
(f) Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be granted only if it appears that the order involves 
substantial rights and may materially affect the final decision or that a determination of the correctness of the order before 
final judgment will better serve the administration and interests of justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth the 
particular issue or point of law which will be considered and may be on such terms, including the filing of a bond for costs 
and damages, as the appellate court may determine. The clerk of the appellate court shall immediately give the parties and trial 
court notice by mail of any order granting or denying the petition. If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed to have 
been filed and docketed by the granting of the petition. All proceedings subsequent to the granting of the petition shall be as, 
and within the time required, for appeals from final judgments except that no docketing statement shall be filed under Rule 9 
unless the court otherwise orders. 
(g) Stays pending interlocutory review. The appellate court will not consider an application for a stay pending disposition of 
an interlocutory appeal until the petitioner has filed a petition for interlocutory appeal. 
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[Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1996; November 1, 1999; April 1, 2004; November 1, 2006; 
November 1,2010.] 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD., 
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vs. 
SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER 
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITDES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Case No. 201001017 SC 
Pursuant to U.R.A.P. 10(a)(2)(B), Appellant/Counterclaimant Consumer 
Protection Group, LLC ("CPG"), submits this Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion for Summary Disposition. CPG moves for summary disposition to 
reverse the order of the trial court based on manifest error. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A panel of three arbitrators, Judith M. Billings, Richard D. Burbidge, and Paul S. 
Felt, presided over this matter for approximately one year, including the resolution of 
numerous motions and an extended evidentiary hearing. On February 2, 2010, the panel 
entered unanimous findings of fact and conclusions of law finding, inter alia, that 
appellee Westgate Resorts, Ltd. had both committed numerous acts of communications 
fraud and violated the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act. In the second phase of the 
arbitration, appellant Consumer Protection Group (CPG) filed a motion for attorney fees 
with the arbitrators pursuant to the UPUAA. 
While the motion for attorney fees was pending, CPG and Westgate filed 
competing motions in the Fourth District Court, CPG seeking to confirm the first-phase 
award and certify it as a final judgment, and Westgate seeking to vacate the award. The 
arbitrators stayed the remainder of the arbitration pending resolution of Westgate's 
motion. 
Westgate's motion to vacate was based upon the single fact that one of the three 
arbitrators, Richard Burbidge, failed to disclose that he is one of 22 first cousins of 
George W. Burbidge, an attorney at Christensen & Jensen (the law firm representing 
CPG), who had no involvement in the Westgate case. Westgate did not object to the 
award on any other grounds. 
Westgate did not claim to have any evidence of actual impropriety by Richard 
Burbidge, and the evidence was uncontested that Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge 
have no personal or social relationship. Nonetheless, the trial court granted Westgate's 
1 
motion to vacate, finding that, regardless of whether any personal relationship exists, the 
failure to disclose the first-cousin relationship required vacatur. As acknowledged by all 
parties, under the trial court's order, the matter in arbitration is to be reheard by a new 
panel of arbitrators. 
CPG petitioned for permission to appeal from the trial court's order. The Court 
granted the petition provisionally, directing the parties to address two threshold issues in 
connection with briefing on the merits, 1) whether the order from which the petition is 
brought is subject to direct appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78B-11-129 or otherwise 
constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal; and 2) whether this Court has 
jurisdiction to review the order pursuant to Rule 5 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
This case is particularly appropriate for summary disposition. Although appellant 
will raise additional issues on appeal (e.g., waiver), this motion is confined to a single, 
narrow issue of statutory interpretation applied to uncontested facts. This state has a 
"policy of expediting judicial treatment of arbitration matters," Buzas Baseball Inc. v. 
Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d at 947 n. 4 (Utah 1996). It has been more than a year since 
the arbitrators issued their first award, and nearly a year since the second phase of the 
arbitration was put on hold. CPG respectfully submits that, under the particular 
circumstances of this case, the trial court's ruling constitutes manifest error, and summary 
reversal is compelled. 
2 
ISSUES PRESENTED1 
1. Is the order from which the petition is brought subject to direct appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-11-129 or, does it otherwise constitute a final judgment for 
purposes of appeal? 
2. Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the order pursuant to Rule 5 of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure? 
3. Did the District Court err in ruling that an undisclosed first-cousin relationship 
between Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge, without more, required vacatur 
of the arbitration award? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Questions of law, including the interpretation of statutes, are reviewed for 
correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, f 17, 977 P.2d 1201. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Procedural Background 
Westgate filed its initial lawsuit in this case on September 19, 2002. In March 
2004, CPG was granted leave to and did file a counterclaim asserting, inter alia, claims 
against Westgate under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (UPUAA). (R. 2755.)2 
Four years later, Westgate filed a motion to compel arbitration of the UPUAA 
claims by virtue of a provision of the Act stating that such claims are "subject to" 
Although this motion for summary disposition is not the briefing on the merits, 
consistent with the Court's provisional order granting interlocutory review, this motion is 
prefaced with discussion of the threshold jurisdictional issues on which the Court 
requested briefing. 
Portions of the record have been paginated. Two exhibits that have not (the ruling and 
the hearing transcript) are attached hereto; other citations are to the record. 
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arbitration. Over CPG's objection, on October 27, 2008, the trial court granted 
Westgate's motion, and ordered the UPUAA claims into arbitration. (R. 4718.) 
It is undisputed that each party selected an arbitrator. Westgate selected Judith 
Billings, CPG selected Richard Burbidge, and the two of them then selected Paul Felt as 
the neutral. After the appointments, Westgate sent an ex parte communication to its 
designee. (R. 5922-5924.) Upon learning about it, CPG objected to ex parte 
communications with arbitrators. Id. In response, the panel members included a 
provision in its arbitration fee agreement with the parties stating that they all considered 
themselves neutral. (R. 5831.) 
After a year of discovery and various motions, the arbitration hearing took place 
December 7-11, 2009, and January 22, 2010. 
On February 2, 2010, the Panel issued unanimous Findings of Facts, Conclusions 
of Law and Award ("Arbitration Award"). (R. 5947.) The Panel found by clear and 
convincing evidence that Westgate had made false and fraudulent representations, 
promises, and non-disclosures with the intent to mislead or with reckless indifference to 
the truth. Id, fflf 10, 23. The Panel also found that the actions of Westgate constituted a 
scheme or artifice to defraud within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, and 
that the scheme constituted a pattern of unlawful activity within the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1602. Id. atffif 10,15. 
The Panel awarded $65,500 on the UPUAA claims. (R. 5937.) CPG then 
submitted a motion for attorney fees pursuant to UPUAA, and a motion in the Fourth 
4 
District Court to confirm the first arbitration award and certify it as final under 
U.R.Civ.P. 54(b). (R. 5797.) Westgate moved to vacate the award. (R. 5909.) 
Westgate's sole objection to the award was that arbitrator Richard D. Burbidge 
had failed to disclose that he is a first cousin of George W. Burbidge II. Westgate's 
principal argument was that, although Arbitrator Burbidge was a party appointee, by 
voluntarily considering himself "neutral" after his appointment, he had subjected himself 
to disclosure requirements applicable to arbitrators designated as neutral by statute. 
CPG argued that voluntary characterizations after appointment do not affect the 
status of party-appointed arbitrators nor the applicable disclosure standards but that, in 
any event, the mere existence of a first-cousin relationship without more is insufficient to 
vacate an award on non-disclosure grounds. 
Facts regarding the Burbidges' relationship 
The following facts were ^incontroverted below (R. 5979-5980; see also R. 5982 
(CPG's Opposition to Westgate's Motion to Vacate), and R. 6076 (Westgate's Reply)): 
Richard D. Burbidge is a first cousin of George W. Burbidge II, one of 22 
first cousins. 
[George W. Burbidge is] a shareholder in Christensen & Jensen. 
Due to a large disparity in ages between their fathers, Richard D. Burbidge 
is a generation older than George W. Burbidge. (Richard D. Burbidge is 61 years 
old; George W. Burbidge II is 42.) 
Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge have no close familial relationship, 
have no active social relationship, do not speak with each other regularly, have no 
business relationship with each other, and have no personal connection outside 
their familial relationship. They have not spoken in many months. They last 
spoke for a minute when they happened to bump into each other during the Utah 
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Bar Convention in Sun Valley, Idaho, in June, 2009. Previously, they both 
attended the funeral of an aunt in March, 2009. 
The law firms at which Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge are 
associated have been adverse to each other in litigation, and Richard Burbidge and 
George Burbidge have been adverse to each other in litigation. 
George Burbidge has had no involvement in the Westgate case. His 
financial interest in any recovery by other shareholders in the firm is indirect. 
George Burbidge has never asked for, discussed, received, or expected in 
any way any financial support or benefit from any of his 22 first cousins, including 
Richard Burbidge. The notion that Richard Burbidge would be influenced by an 
indirect interest in facilitating George Burbidge5 s indirect interest in a recovery, or 
vice versa, is unreasonable. 
Westgate does not claim that any actual conflict existed on the part of Richard D. 
Burbidge, or that he evidenced any partiality in the proceedings.3 
On December 13, 2010, the Fourth District Court entered an order vacating the 
arbitration award. The court ruled that the first-cousin relationship in itself was a fact 
that Richard Burbidge was required to disclose, because a reasonable person would 
consider that fact likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator. Exh. 1, pp. 7-8. The 
3
 Westgate counsel: "We've never made an accusation that Mr. Burbidge did anything 
untoward in connection with discharging his duties as an arbitrator, other than failing to 
make these disclosures. Again, as the Court pointed out in its synopsis of the - of CPG's 
position, we've never used the undue means or fraud trigger under the - under Section 
125. We've never brought that up. That's not part of it. The only one that we've 
invoked is the evident partiality. That is only because in Section 113 the presumption of 
evident partiality is created by the failure to make that disclosure. So we've never 
professed, and we agreed to this in the reply, that we're making a factual showing that 
Mr. Burbidge engaged in fraud or undue means or there was evident partiality as a matter 
of objective evidence or proof. We've not pointed to anything he said or did during the 
proceedings or anything like that." (Exh. 2, Transcript of Hearing, August 4, 2010, pp 
30-31.) 
6 
Trial Court concluded that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(l)(b) mandated disclosure, and 
that evident partiality was presumed under § 78B-11-113(5). The Court vacated the 
arbitration award under § 78B-1 l-124(l)(b)(i) and (iii). Id. at 8. 
Now, more than two years since arbitration was compelled, after the expenditure 
of hundreds of hours of attorney time and nearly $150,000 in arbitrator fees alone, the 
parties face having to re-arbitrate if the trial court's ruling is permitted to stand. 
Additionally, under the trial court's order, all of the work of the prior panel, including 
rulings on numerous motions and discovery disputes, will be of no legal effect and the 
parties will have to begin from scratch.4 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ORDER FROM WHICH THE PETITION IS BROUGHT IS NOT SUBJECT TO 
DIRECT APPEAL, AND, IN ANY EVENT, AN IMMEDIATE APPEAL WOULD BE 
PERMISSIVE, NOT MANDATORY. 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-11-129 provides that an appeal may be taken from: "(a) an 
order denying a motion to compel arbitration; (b) an order granting a motion to stay 
arbitration; (c) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award; (d) an order 
modifying or correcting an award; (e) an order vacating an award without directing a 
rehearing; or (f) a final judgment entered pursuant to this chapter." 
None of the bases for appeal listed in §129 is applicable to this matter. The Ruling 
and subsequent Order issued by the trial court do not constitute a final judgment in the 
case as it did not resolve any claim between the parties and denied certification as final. 
4
 Additionally, only portions of the arbitration proceeding were recorded. Consequently, 
several live witnesses will have to be brought in again. 
7 
Nor did the trial court deny a motion to compel arbitration, stay arbitration, or modify or 
correct the award. The trial court observed that if it granted the motion to vacate, it was 
not required to issue an order confirming the award, and denied CPG's motion and to 
enter a final order under U.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Exh. 1 at 6, 7. 
The parties agree that the arbitration is to be reheard by a new panel unless this 
Court reverses the trial court's Order, and thus the order does not constitute a vacature 
"without ordering a rehearing.55 As acknowledged by Westgate in its opposition to 
CPG's petition for interlocutory appeal, "The Order calls for re-arbitration of the case." 
Response in Opposition to Petition for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Appeal at 
7; see also id. at 8, 9 ("CPG's right to arbitrate its case in front of a neutral and impartial 
panel is unaffected55), and 10 ("the District Court's Order, which in the jargon, ordered a 
Mo-over555), and Petition for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order, pp. 4, 6, 15 
("Unless interlocutory review is granted, the parties will be forced to start over in an 
arbitration that has already cost hundreds of thousands of dollars."); also Exh. 2, p. 34 
("[Westgate counsel]: What the statute says, though, is if you do vacate for evident 
impartiality, you order a rehearing. THE COURT: Sure.55)5 
5
 By statute, an order granting vacatur without a rehearing is typically reserved for 
grounds that, by their nature, preclude a subsequent rehearing of the arbitration. See, e.g., 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124(3) ("If the court vacates an award on a ground other than 
that set forth in Subsection (l)(e) [that there was no agreement to arbitrate], it may order 
a rehearing. If the award is vacated on a ground stated in Subsection (l)(a) or (b) 
[evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral], the rehearing must be before a 
new arbitrator.55 
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Because none of the bases listed in §78B-11-129 is applicable, the trial court's 
Order is not subject to a direct appeal. If the Order is allowed to stand, the parties will 
face a new round of arbitration hearings with a new panel, new costs and fees, and a new 
round of testimony from the witnesses. 
As an additional observation, CPG notes that, even if grounds identified in § 78B-
11-129 had been present, an immediate appeal under that section is permissive, not 
mandatory: "(1) A*1 appeal may be taken..." This Court and the Court of Appeals have 
consistently noted that "may" is a word of permission, not mandate. See, e.g., In re 
Olympus Const, L.C., 2009 UT 29, f 15, 215 P.3d 129 ("[Utah Code Ann. § 48~2c-] 
1305 (1) provides, 'A dissolved company in winding up may dispose of the known 
claims against it by following the procedures described in this section.5 (Emphasis added 
[by court].) Use of the provisions of this section is permissive rather than mandatory. 
That is, a dissolved company may elect to follow the procedures in this section or it may 
choose another route."); Diversified Holdings, L.C v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, | 32, 63 
P.3d 686 ("This use of 'may' is permissive, rather than mandatory"); Glezos v. Frontier 
Investments, 896 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1995 ) ("[U.R.A.P.] 10(a) provides: 'Within 10 
days after the docketing statement is served, a party may move: (1) To dismiss the 
appeal or the petition for review on the basis that the appellate court has no jurisdiction.' 
Utah R.App.P. 10(a) (emphasis added [by court]). Rule 10(a) is permissive, not 
mandatory.59); Pugh v. Dozzo-Hughes, 2005 UT App. 203, f 13, 112 P.3d 1247 ("a rule 
38 motion to substitute parties on appeal is permissive, not mandatory. See Utah R.App. 
9 
P. 38(a) (stating another "party may be substituted as a party" by motion (emphasis added 
[by court])).6 
n . THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION PURSUANT T O U.R.A.P. 5. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 7 8A--3-102(3)0. Rule 5(a) provides that an appeal from an interlocutory order 
may be sought within 20 days after the entry of the order. U.R.A.P. 5(a). This Court has 
explained that "no finality will be ascribed to a memorandum decision or minute entry for 
purposes of triggering the running of the time for appeal until the prevailing party 
prepares and submits a proposed order." Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2008 UT 86, Tf 11; 
206 P. 3d 287; citing to Code v. Dept. of Health, 2007 UT 43,19,162 P.3d 1097. 
In this matter, the trial court issued a Ruling on September 30, 2010, and directed 
Westgate to prepare an order consistent with the opinion. The Order prepared by 
Westgate was signed and entered on December 13, 2010. CPG filed its Petition for 
interlocutory appeal on December 22,2010, well within the 20 days allotted by Rule 5(a). 
Therefore the Petition was timely and the Court has jurisdiction. 
6
 That is only logical: Any other reading would compel an immediate appeal when it 
might not otherwise be necessary or desired, sacrificing judicial economy and potentially 
causing additional delay. For example, a party might choose not to appeal immediately 
an order staying an arbitration if it felt that a resolution of non-arbitrable issues would 
resolve the case more quickly (and/or at less expense). 
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HI. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION O F THE UTAH ARBITRATION ACT WAS 
MANIFEST ERROR. 
The burden for vacating an arbitration award in Utah is steep. This Court has 
explained that "a motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award is limited to 
determining whether any of the very limited grounds for modification or vacatur exist." 
Pacific Development L.C. v. Orton, 2001 UT 36, % 23 P. 3d 1035 (citing Buzas 
Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P. 2d 941, 947 (Utah 1996)). 
As discussed infra, CPG takes issue with the trial court's ruling that Richard 
Burbidge was a "neutral" appointee under the Utah Arbitration Act. However, even 
assuming that he was, the trial court erred in two central respects, either of which requires 
reversal. Understanding the nature of the error requires articulation of the relationship 
among the two disclosure provisions in the Act, one of which applies only to neutrals, 
and the other of which applies to both neutral- and party-appointees. As discussed 
herein, the trial court erred under either standard. 
Neutral appointees are subject to a disclosure requirement in the Act that does not 
apply to party appointees. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(5), states that a neutral 
appointee who does not disclose a "known, existing, and substantial relationship with a 
party" is presumed to act with evident partiality: 
[78B-11-113(5)] An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator who does 
not disclose a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the 
arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship 
with a party is presumed to act with evident partiality under Subsection 
78B-ll-124(l)(b). 
Section 78B-1 l-124(l)(b), in turn, provides: 
11 
Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the 
court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if: 
* * * 
(b) there was: 
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a 
neutral arbitrator. 
In interpreting these provisions, the trial court erred in a couple of respects, either 
of which requires reversal. First, it erroneously interpreted "substantial relationship55 as 
including first-cousin relationships unaccompanied by any personal, social, or financial 
relationship. Second, it erroneously assumed that the presumption of evident partiality 
was irrebuttable, when all evidence - and Westgate's own concession - was that no 
partiality was evidenced by Arbitrator Burbidge. 
A. Richard Burbidge's first-cousin relationship with George 
Burbidge, without more, was not a "substantial relationship" 
with a party.7 
The legislature did not define "substantial relationship55 within the Arbitration Act, 
and this Court need not do so now. It is enough that the (non)relationship in this case 
does not qualify. From the language of the statute, it is self-evident that a relationship in 
itself is insufficient to implicate Section 78B-11-113(5); it must be "substantial.55 
CPG does not dispute that Richard Burbidge5 s consanguinity with George Burbidge was 
a "known55 and "existing55 relationship. Consequently, this discussion focuses on whether 
it satisfied the third element, a "substantial55 relationship with a party. 
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This Court has warned against interpreting the Arbitration Act so as to impose an 
"appearance of impropriety" standard on arbitrators. In DeVore v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 
884 P.2d 1246, 1255 (Utah 1994), the Court observed: 
[A]s a matter of policy, we think an appearance-of-partiality standard 
sets an impractically low threshold, especially in a small state like Utah. 
Indeed, to disqualify any arbitrator who has professional dealings with 
one of the parties (to say nothing of a social acquaintanceship) would 
make it impossible, in some circumstances, to find a qualified arbitrator 
at all.8 
Similarly, the Utah Ethics Advisory Committee has opined that the participation of 
a cousin may result injudicial disqualification under the (former) general Canon 3C(1) 
impartiality standard "if a close personal relationship exists" (R. 5920, Informal 
Opinion No. 89-5 (emphasis added).) The opinion, while not binding on the Court, 
supports the contention that a first-cousin relationship alone is not sufficient for 
disqualification even of a sitting judge - the genetic relationship must be accompanied by 
a personal or social relationship, which all parties agree is not present here. 
In short, being one of 22 cousins, with a 19-year age gap, virtually no personal 
interaction - in fact, less of a social relationship than many unrelated attorneys - and no 
financial connection cannot reasonably be construed as a "substantial" relationship. See, 
e.g., Washburn v. McManus, 895 F. Supp 392, 399 (D. Conn. 1994) ("The mere fact of a 
prior relationship is not in and of itself sufficient to disqualify arbitrators. The 
8
 The Court's observation regarding the effect of the size of the legal community and 
jurisdiction is fitting here: Particularly with Utah's large families and unique heritage, it 
would be hard to find a law firm in town that does not have a Christensen, Jensen, Snow, 
Burbidge, etc. 
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relationship between the arbitrator and the party's principal must be so intimate -
personally, socially, professionally, or financially - as to cast serious doubt on the 
arbitrator's impartiality"). 
In Morelite Construction Corp. v. NY City District Council Carpenters Benefit 
Fund, 748 F.2d 79 (2nd Cir. 1984), cited approvingly by this Court in DeVore, the 
Second Circuit upheld the disqualification of an arbitrator whose son was president of the 
Union, a district chapter of which was a party to the arbitration. However, the court 
narrow7ed its ruling and observed that 
[w]e need not, and do not, attempt to set forth a list of familial or other 
relationships that will result in the per se vacation of an arbitration 
award, except to suggest that such a list would most likely be very short. 
We do not intend to hold arbitrators to all the standards of Canon 3. 748 
F.2dat85. 
The court also predicted post arbitration "sour grapes" by losing parties, stating 
that "[njeither do we intend that unsuccessful parties to arbitration may have awards set 
aside by seeking out and finding tenuous relationships between the arbitrator and the 
successful party." Id. As a California court stated recently, 
[t]he test is an objective one - whether such an impression is created in 
the eye of the hypothetical reasonable person. Thus, unless a reasonable 
member of the public at large, aware of all the facts, would fairly 
entertain doubts concerning the arbitrator's impartiality, the arbitrator is 
not subject to disqualification. 
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Mahnke v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 4th 565, 579, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197, 206 
(2009). In this matter, a reasonable person, aware of all the facts, would not fairly 
entertain doubts regarding the impartiality of Richard Burbidge.9 
B. The uncontroverted evidence rebutted the presumption of 
evident partiality in any event. 
Westgate successfully argued below that Richard Burbidge5 s failure to disclose the 
first-cousin relationship with George Burbidge "is both statutorily presumed to constitute 
evident partiality and is, in fact, evident partiality " (R. 5909 at 15; also Exh. 2, p. 31 
("It's the presumption, which the statute does not say is rebuttable.... We're saying it is, 
you know, an irrebuttable presumption of evident partiality which mandates vacatur here 
under the statute.").) 
But as CPG pointed out, presumptions are just that, presumptions. See, e.g., Exh. 
2, pp. 38-39 ("[A] presumption is always rebuttable unless stated otherwise. Courts often 
refer to it as a balloon. That the balloon is the presumption, and as soon as evidence is 
presented contrary to the presumption, the balloon pops."); U.R.E. 301(1); Burns v. 
9
 Both Westgate and the Trial Court relied on a 1968 U. S. Supreme Court opinion for the 
proposition that arbitrators are required to "disclose to the parties any dealings that might 
create an impression of possible bias." Exh 1 (court's ruling) at 8, quoting 
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968). 
However, this Court not only rejected that standard in DeVore, but expressly found 
reliance upon Commonwealth to be misplaced, noting that the quoted language "captured 
only three other votes," and that one of the concurring justices, "Justice White further 
concluded that an arbitrator cannot be expected to provide the parties with a complete and 
unexpurgated business biography. But it is enough for present purposes to hold, as the 
Court does, that where an arbitrator has a substantial interest in a firm which had done 
more than trivial business with a party, that fact must be disclosed." DeVore, 884 P.2d at 
1255 n. 11 (brackets omitted). 
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Boyden, 2006 UT 14, \ 20, 133 P.3d 370; Richard C. Mangrum & Dee V. Benson, 
MANGRUM & BENSON ON UTAH EVIDENCE, at 101-102 (2009-2010 ed.) ("If the basic 
fact is established and evidence is presented challenging the presumed fact, then the 
presumption either disappears . . . or remains to allocate the burden of persuasion as to 
the nonexistence of the presumed fact. . . ."). Contrast Davis v. Provo City Corp., 2008 
UT 59, ffif 22-23, 193 P.3d 86 (applying statute in which legislature used term 
"conclusive presumption" and citing other statutes with that wording). Indeed, if the 
legislature had intended a failure to disclose a substantial relationship in itself to mandate 
vacatur, it would simply have listed such failure to disclose as a ground for mandatory 
vacatur under Section 78B-11-124(1), rather than creating a presumption in Section 78B-
11-113(5). 
CPG adduced affirmative, unrefiited evidence rebutting any inference of partiality, 
including the fact that no social, personal, or financial relationship existed, that a material 
difference in age existed, and that the two Burbidges and their firms have been adverse to 
each other in litigation. See pp. 5-6, supra. Moreover, Mr. Burbidge was one of three 
arbitrators, whose decision was unanimous, and who, while affording substantial relief to 
CPG, did reject portions of CPG's claims. {See R. 5947.) 
Once CPG adduced affirmative evidence rebutting the presumption, the burden 
fell upon Westgate to come up with something from which "a reasonable person would 
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conclude that an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality . . . ." DeVore v. 
IHCHospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 1246,1256 (Utah 1994).10 
Westgate adduced no such evidence. In fact, counsel conceded that it had no such 
evidence to offer: "So we've never professed, and we agreed to this in the reply, that 
we're making a factual showing that Mr. Burbidge engaged in fraud or undue means or 
there was evident partiality as a matter of objective evidence or proof. We've not pointed 
to anything he said or did during the proceedings or anything like that." (Exh. 2, pp. 30-
31.) (Emphasis added.) 
As a matter of law, therefore, Westgate failed to meet the requirements of 
mandatory vacatur under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1 l-124(l)(b). The appropriateness of 
this conclusion is illustrated by the Court's application of a similar standard in DeVore. 
In that case, several years before the arbitration, the sole arbitrator (Mabey) had been an 
LDS stake president under whom an adverse witness served as bishop, a relationship that 
the trial court characterized as "significant and important." 
That relationship, without more, was insufficient for a reasonable person to find 
that the arbitrator showed partiality, this Court concluded. "There is no evidence in the 
record that this particular relationship has continued in any substantial way since 1980," 
10
 Applying similar language in the predecessor to § 78B-11-124, this Court rejected a 
standard that would require a party seeking vacatur to prove actual partiality. Rather, the 
movant must prove that "a reasonable person would conclude that an arbitrator, 
appointed as neutral, showed partiality Furthermore, the burden of proof falls on the 
movant, and the evidence of partiality must be certain and direct, not remote, uncertain, 
or speculative." DeVore, 884 P.2d at 1256 (emphasis added). There is no material 
difference between the "showed partiality" language construed in DeVore and the 
"evident partiality" language presently utilized in the Act. Id. at 1256 n. 12. 
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the Court noted. "Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that Mabey continued 
to be, if indeed he ever was, influenced by his alleged love, respect, and admiration for 
[the witness]. The affidavits submitted by Dr. DeVore contain, at best, remote, uncertain, 
and speculative statements. . . . A reasonable person would not regard them as 
establishing certain and direct evidence for Mabey's allegiance to [the witness] or any 
resultant partiality to IHCH." 884 P.2d at 1257 (emphases added). 
The Court further noted that cc[t]here is no evidence in the record that Mabey did 
anything but use his best judgment to decide the issues of fact and law before him. That 
Mabey found IHCH's arguments more persuasive than Dr. DeVore's is not evidence of 
bias. Indeed, neither an arbitrator's consistent reliance on the winning party's evidence 
nor the arbitrator's conclusion in the winning party's favor establish partiality." Id at 
1257. 
The trial court erred in assuming that the presumption of evident partiality was 
sufficient to compel mandatory vacatur, and in failing to recognize that the presumption 
had been rebutted by the uncontroverted evidence. 
C. The trial court also erred in concluding that a non-disclosure 
under Utah Code Ann. § 788-11-113(1) had occurred and that 
any such non-disclosure would mandate vacatur. 
If, as CPG contends, Section 78B-11-113(5) has no bearing on this case, that 
leaves only one additional provision of the Utah Arbitration Act in play. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-11-113(1) is a general disclosure requirement that applies to all arbitrators, 
whether party-appointed or neutral. Because this standard encompasses arbitrators 
known to be non-neutral, it imposes a lower standard for disclosure than that for neutrals: 
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[78B-11-113(1)] Before accepting appointment, an individual who is 
requested to serve as an arbitrator, after making a reasonable inquiry, shall 
disclose to all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration 
proceeding and to any other arbitrators any known facts that a reasonable 
person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator in 
the arbitration proceeding, including: 
* * * 
(b) an existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the 
agreement to arbitrate or the arbitration proceeding, their counsel or 
representatives, a witness, or another arbitrator. 
This provision does not require disclosure of a relationship at all unless "a 
reasonable person would consider [the relationship] likely to affect the impartiality of 
the arbitrator . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, even if such relationship is found, it 
does not mandate vacatur, as the lower court held; failure to disclose under § 78B-11-
113(1) leaves vacatur to the court's discretion: 
[§ 78B-11-113(4)] If the arbitrator did not disclose a fact as required by 
Subsection (1) or (2), upon timely objection by a party, the court under 
Subsection 78B-1 l-124(l)(b) may vacate an award. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In citing Section 78B-11-113 as a basis for vacatur, the trial court erred in two 
respects: First, for the reasons discussed above, CPG submits that no reasonable person 
would conclude that the relationship at issue in this case was "likely" to affect Arbitrator 
Burbidge's impartiality. Second, even if such likelihood could be found, it does not 
mandate vacatur, as the trial court ("reluctantly") believed; rather, the issue is subject to 
the exercise of sound discretion. 
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Because CPG adduced incontroverted evidence that there was no tie between the 
Burbidges beyond shared ancestors, it would have been an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to vacate the award under the correct standard. Consequently, it is appropriate on 
these undisputed facts for the Court to remand with directions to enter judgment in favor 
of CPG. 
IV. ALTHOUGH THE ARBITRATORS ALL CONSIDERED THEMSELVES NEUTRAL AND 
CONDUCTED THEMSELVES ACCORDINGLY AFTER THEIR APPOINTMENT, MR. 
BURBIDGE WAS NOT A "NEUTRAL" APPOINTEE UNDER THE ARBITRATION 
ACT. 
Westgate argued that all three arbitrators in this matter were statutorily neutral, 
and the trial court considered Richard Burbidge as a "neutral" arbitrator under the statute. 
Exh. 1, pp. 3, 8. It is true that the Panel members decided after their appointment to 
consider themselves neutral, and conducted the proceeding accordingly. They then stated 
their understanding in an "Arbitration Fee Agreement" which the parties signed. 
A post-appointment decision by arbitrators cannot retroactively transform the 
nature of their earlier appointment into the appointment of three statutory "neutrals" 
under the Utah Arbitration Act. Indeed, Westgate's choice to forward copies of various 
State court pleading ex parte to "its" arbitrator contradicts the argument that it considered 
its chosen arbitrator, Judith Billings, to have been a "neutral" appointee. 
The appointees in this matter acted in an objective, professional manner 
throughout the arbitration and, as discussed above, the same result would obtain 
regardless of whether the standards for "neutrals" applied to all three arbitrators. 
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However, the trial court's failure to address the legal distinction between a party-
appointed arbitrator and an arbitrator-appointed arbitrator was error. 
As ordered by the trial court in its Order Regarding Westgate Resorts LTD's 
Motion to Compel Arbitration (10/27/08), the process utilized in appointing arbitrators in 
this case is familiar to anyone who litigates in Utah: each party appointed an arbitrator, 
and those two arbitrators appointed a neutral. In practice, attorneys are trained to be, and 
generally are, objective in their assessments of facts and law. Nonetheless, party-selected 
arbitrators are not "neutral" appointees under the Arbitration Act, and no party could 
reasonably claim otherwise. 
The Utah Code indirectly recognizes different roles for party-selected arbitrators 
and for 'neutral' arbitrators. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-11-112(2); 78B-11-
113(5); 78B-11-124. Other courts have similarly recognized that subjecting party-
selected arbitrators to the same disclosures and disqualification requirements is 
inconsistent with legislation recognizing the different roles. See, e.g., Mahnke v. 
Superior Court, supra at 577-578; Washburn v. McManus, supra at 399 (some 
subjectiveness is tolerated and even expected from party-selected arbitrators); Daiichi 
Hawaii Real Estate Corp. v. Lichter, 82 P. 3d 411, 428 (Hawaii 2003) ("it stands to 
intuitive reason that a party-appointed arbitrator might view the proceeding through a 
more subjective and partial lens than a neutral arbitrator"); Astoria Med. Group. V. 
Health Ins. Plan Greater NY, 182 N.E. 2d 85,88 (1962) ("the very reason each of the 
parties contract for the choice of his own arbitrator is to make certain that his 'side' will, 
in a sense, be represented on the tribunal"); Aetna Gas & Sur. Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A. 2d 
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88, 92 (R.I. 1991) ("it would be inappropriate to require the party-appointed arbitrators to 
adhere to the same standard of neutrality as a judge. That standard ignores the practical 
realities of arbitration panels composed of party-appointed arbitrators55). 
As appointees whom the parties had not designated as neutral prior to their 
appointment, Richard Burbidge and Judith Billings were subject to the general disclosure 
requirements of Section 78B-11-113(1), not the neutral-specific requirements of Section 
78B-11-113(5). Accordingly, no presumption of evident partiality ever arose, and the 
trial court erred in vacating the award based upon such a presumption. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND 
LITIGATION EXPENSES ON APPEAL 
As urged above, CPG is entitled to an order reversing the trial court's order of 
vacatur as manifest error. If CPG prevails in this appeal, it is entitled to "reasonable 
attorney fees and other reasonable expenses of litigation" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-11-126 (fees and expenses recoverable by prevailing party in contested judicial 
proceeding under Section 78B-11-123 (confirmation) or 78B-11-124 (vacatur).) 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's legal ruling 
that a first cousin relationship with an attorney not directly involved in the arbitration, 
without more, triggered a duty to disclose on the part of the arbitrator and provided a 
basis for vacating the award. That ruling was manifest error. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Procedural Background 
Westgate filed its initial lawsuit in this case on September 19, 2002. In March 
2004, CPG was granted leave to file a counterclaim asserting, inter alia, claims against 
Westgate under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (UPUA). Four years later, 
Westgate filed a motion to compel arbitration of the UPUA claims by virtue of a 
provision of the act stating that such claims are "subject to" arbitration. Over CPG's 
objection (based upon timeliness and waiver grounds), on October 27, 2008, the trial 
court granted Westgate9s motion, and ordered the UPUA claims into arbitration. 
Each party selected an arbitrator, who then selected a third arbitrator. Westgate 
selected Judith Billings, CPG selected Richard Burbidge, and the two of them selected 
Paul Felt as the neutral. After their appointment, Westgate sent an ex parte 
communication to its designee. Upon learning of the communication, CPG objected, and 
in response, the panel members stated that they considered themselves neutral. 
After a year of discovery and numerous motions, the arbitration took place 
December 7-11,2009, and January 22, 2010. 
On February 2, 2010, the Panel issued Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and 
Award ("Arbitration Award"), attached hereto as Exhibit 1. The Panel unanimously 
found by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate had made false and fraudulent 
representations, promises, and non-disclosures with the intent to mislead or with reckless 
indifference to the truth. Arbitration Award at ffif 10 and 23, 
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The Panel also found unanimously that the actions of Westgate constituted a 
scheme or artifice to defraud within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, and 
that the scheme constituted a pattern of unlawful activity within the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1602. Id. atf l 10 and 15. 
The Panel further found unanimously that Westgate profited from its operation 
and enterprise within the meaning of Section 76-10-1603 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
Id. at 116. 
The Panel awarded $65,500 on the UPUA claims. Exhibit 1 at 11. CPG then 
submitted a motion for attorney fees pursuant to UPUA, and a motion in the Fourth 
District Court to confirm the arbitration award. 
In response, Westgate moved to vacate the award. Westgate's sole basis for 
challenging the award was that arbitrator Richard D. Burbidge had failed to disclose that 
he is a cousin of George W. Burbidge II, an attorney at Christensen & Jensen, the law 
firm representing CPG. Westgate argued that, although Mr. Burbidge was a party 
appointee, by voluntarily considering himself "neutral" after his appointment, Mr. 
Burbidge had subjected himself to enhanced disclosure requirements applicable to 
arbitrators designated as neutral by statute. 
CPG argued that the mere existence of a first-cousin relationship without more is 
insufficient grounds to vacate an award under either neutral or party-appointee standards, 
and that voluntary characterizations after appointment do not affect the status of 
arbitrators as neutral or non-neutral nor the applicable disclosure standards. 
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Facts 
It was undisputed below that: 
Richard D. Burbidge is one of 22 first cousins of George W. Burbidge. 
George W. Burbidge is a member of Christensen & Jensen, the law firm 
representing CPG. 
Due to a large disparity in ages between their fathers, Richard D. Burbidge is a 
generation older than George Burbidge. (Richard D. Burbidge is 61 years old, George 
W. Burbidge His 42.) 
Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge have no close familial relationship, have 
no active social relationship, do not speak with each other regularly, have no business 
relationship with each other, and have no personal connection outside their familial 
relationship. They have not spoken in many months. They last spoke for a minute when 
they happened to bump into each other during the Utah Bar Convention in Sun Valley, 
Idaho, in June, 2009. Previously, they both attended the fimeral of an aunt in March, 
2009. 
The law firms at which Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge are associated 
have been adverse to each other in litigation, and Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge 
have been adverse to each other in litigation. 
George Burbidge has had no involvement in the Westgate case. His financial 
interest in any recovery by other shareholders in the firm is indirect 
George Burbidge has never asked for, discussed, received, or expected in any way 
any financial support or benefit from any of his 22 first cousins, including Richard 
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Burbidge. The notion that Richard Burbidge would be influenced by an indirect interest 
in facilitating George Burbidge's indirect interest in a recovery, or vice versa, is 
unreasonable. 
Westgate does not claim that any actual conflict existed on the part of Richard 
Burbidge, or that any impropriety occurred. Its argument is limited to a per se violation.1 
On December 13, 2010, the Fourth District Court entered an order vacating the 
arbitration award. The court ruled that the first-cousin to George Burbidge in itself was a 
fact that Richard Burbidge was required to disclose, because a reasonable person would 
consider that fact likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator. Exhibit 3 pp. 7-8. The 
trial court concluded that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-ll-113(l)(b) mandated disclosure, and 
that partiality was presumed under Section 78B-11-113(5). The Court vacated the 
arbitration award under Section 78B-1 l-124(l)(b)(i) and (iii). Exhibit 3 p. 8. 
Now, more than two years since arbitration was compelled, after the expenditure 
of hundreds of hours of attorney time and nearly $150,000 in arbitrator fees alone, the 
parties face having to re-arbitrate if interlocutory review is not available. Additionally, 
1
 Westgate counsel: "We've never made an accusation that Mr. Burbidge did anything 
untoward in connection with discharging his duties as an arbitrator, other than failing to 
make these disclosures. Again, as the Court pointed out in its synopsis of the - of CPG's 
position, we've never used the undue means or fraud trigger under the — under Section 
125. We've never brought that up. That's not part of it. The only one that we've invoked 
is the evident partiality. That is only because in Section 113 the presumption of evident 
partiality is created by the failure to make that disclosure. So we've never professed, and 
we agreed to this in the reply, that we're making a factual showing that Mr. Burbidge 
engaged in fraud or undue means or there was evident partiality as a matter of objective 
evidence or proof. We've not pointed to anything he said or did during the proceedings or 
anything like that." Exhibit 2, Transcript of Hearing, August 4,2010. 
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under the trial court's order, all of the work of the prior panel, including rulings on 
numerous motions and discovery disputes, will be of no legal effect and the parties will 
have to begin from scratch. As such, the order involves substantial rights of the parties, 
particularly the right of Westgate to enforcement of an arbitration award. 
Issue Presented and Standard of Review 
Did the District Court err in ruling that a first cousin relationship, with an attorney 
not directly involved in the case in itself triggered a mandatory duty to disclose on the 
part of Richard Burbidge under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-11-112 and 113, the breach of 
which mandated vacation of the arbitration award? 
Did the District Court err in ruling that a party-appointed arbitrator should be 
treated as a neutral if an arbitration panel decides sua sponte that each arbitrator will act 
as a neutral? 
Questions of law, including the interpretation of statutes, are reviewed for 
correctness. See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, If 17, 977 P.2d 1201; A.K. & 
R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 87, K 11, 977P.2d518, 
cert denied, 994P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). 
Preservation 
The issues presented were argued to the District Court in the parties' respective 
motions to enforce and to vacate the arbitration award, and form the basis for the District 
Court's decision, 
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 Additionally, only portions of the arbitration proceeding were recorded. Consequently, 
most live witnesses will have to be brought in again. 
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NECESSITY OF IMMEDIATE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
The Order vacating the arbitration award leaves the parties where they were two 
years ago, facing the beginning of a new round of arbitration hearings with a new panel, 
and new costs and fees, and leaving the witnesses facing another round of testimony. 
This Court has ruled that an award may be vacated only if a reasonable person 
would conclude that an arbitrator, showed partiality or was guilty of misconduct that 
prejudiced the rights of any party, and that the burden of proof falls on the movant to 
show that the evidence of partiality is certain and direct, not remote, uncertain, or 
speculative. DeVore v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 884 P. 2d 1246, 1256 (Utah 1994). 
Resolving the issue presented may obviate the need for a re-arbitration of the disputes 
between the parties. 
There are no issues of fact in dispute. The first cousin relationship is 
uncontroverted, as is the lack of any business relationship, social relationship, or familial 
activity between the arbitrator and an attorney who is not involved in this matter, but 
whose law partners represent one of the parties to the arbitration. The only issue to be 
decided is purely legal in nature, a task well suited for interlocutory appeal. Where 
Westgate raised only this single issue in objecting to confirmation, a reversal of the trial 
court's ruling will entitled CPG to confirmation of the award, and much time, costs and 
fees will be saved. 
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Analysis of Statutes and Rules 
A. Even If All Three Arbitrators Had Been "Neutral" Appointments 
Under The Act, Westgate Has Not Made Even A Prima Facie Case For 
Disqualification* 
As stated below, it is CPG's view (and Westgate does not dispute) that all three 
arbitrators performed in a neutral and professional manner throughout this complex 
arbitration. Even applying the measure of recusal / disclosure most favorable to Westgate 
(all three arbitrators deemed neutral appointees) the trial court's ruling was erroneous. 
The essence of Westgate's argument, and the trial court's ruling, was that the mere 
existence of a first-cousin relationship, without more, is enough to disqualify an arbitrator 
and taint the award because the arbitrator did not reveal the genetic relationship. But this 
contention is not even sufficient to require the disqualification of a judge in Utah, let 
alone an arbitrator. 
1. Utah Ethics Advisory Committee opinion 89-5 and DeVore v. 
IHC Hospitals 
An opinion of the Utah Ethics Advisory Committee applicable to judges held that 
"the participation of a cousin may still result injudicial disqualification under the general 
Canon 3C(1) impartiality standard if a close personal relationship exists." Informal 
Opinion No. 89-5. The opinion, while not binding on the court, provides support for the 
contention that a first-cousin relationship alone is not sufficient for disqualification - only 
one accompanied by a "close personal relationship." Even if Richard Burbidge were a 
sitting judge, he would not be disqualified merely because he is one of nearly two dozen 
first cousins of George Burbidge, where the two have no close personal relationship. It is 
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the depth and extent of the relationship - or, as in this case, the absence thereof- that is 
controlling. 
Similarly, this Court has ruled that an arbitration award may be vacated only 
[i]f a reasonable person would conclude that an arbitrator, appointed as neutral, 
showed partiality or was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of any 
party. Furthermore, the burden of proof falls on the movant, and the evidence of 
partiality must be certain and direct, not remote, uncertain, or speculative. 
DeVore v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 884 P. 2d 1246,1256 (Utah 1994). 
Although Westgate conceded that it did not claim, nor did it cite any evidence, that 
arbitrator Burbidge showed partiality, the trial court held that a first cousin relationship is 
a fact that a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the 
arbitrator. Exhibit 3 pp. 7-8. The trial court's conclusion that a mere genetic relationship 
is sufficient is directly contrary to DeVore's conclusion that - absent actual evidence of 
bias - recusal of an arbitrator is not required even when based upon professional dealings 
or a social relationship with counsel: 
[A]s a matter of policy, we think an appearance-of-partiality standard sets an 
unpractically low threshold, especially in a small state like Utah. Indeed, to 
disqualify any arbitrator who has professional dealings with one of the parties (to 
say nothing of a social acquaintanceship) would make it impossible, in some 
circumstances, to find a qualified arbitrator at all. 
DeVore v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 884 P. 2d at 1255. 
In this case, there is no business relationship, no social relationship, no familial 
activity, and no financial tie between the two men. The trial court's conflation of a 
similar DNA pattern with a close personal relationship is insupportable under Utah law. 
With no claim or evidence of actual partiality, the court below concluded that the failure 
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to disclose the genetic relationship creates a presumption of partiality. Informal Opinion, 
p. 8. With respect, that is not Utah law. When none of the statutory or judicially created 
grounds exist, a motion to vacate an award must be denied. Bvzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt 
Lake Trappers, 925 P. 2d at 951. 
2. Utah Arbitration Act 
The statutorily presumed partiality to which the trial court refers is found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-11-113. That code section provides that "an arbitrator appointed as a 
neutral arbitrator who does not disclose a known, direct, and material interest in the 
outcome of the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship 
with a party is presumed to act with evident partiality under Subsection 78B-11-
124(l)(b)'\ Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(5). By its own terms, however, the statute is 
inapplicable here. Burbidge has no interest in the outcome of the arbitration at all, and no 
existing, "substantial relationship" with a party, or with counsel for a party. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(1) provides that an arbitrator must disclose 
any known facts that a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the 
impartiality of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, including: (a) a financial 
or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; and (b) an 
existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the agreement to arbitrate or 
the arbitration proceeding, their counsel or representatives, a witness, or another 
arbitrator. 
Factors (a) and (b) do not apply here. However, the trial court concluded that, no 
matter how attenuated, the familial relationship between George Burbidge II and Richard 
Burbidge qualifies under the "reasonable person would consider likely to affect" 
language. But a reasonable person would not consider a familial relationship not marked 
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by a substantial association or rapport likely to affect the impartiality of an attorney-
arbitrator. 
The standard established by the Court and the Utah Code require that the party 
alleging bias establish facts creating a reasonable impression of bias. The reasonable 
person standard requires direct and certain evidence of a known, existing and substantial 
relationship, not speculative statements of a remote, uncertain, or non-existent 
relationship. 
3. Federal Decisions 
When necessary, Utah law looks to federal law for guidance on issues of 
arbitration. Buzas Baseball, 925 P. 2d at 948, n. 5. Of course, there is no such need 
when there is already Utah case law on point, see supra. In any event, however, the 
former does not support the trial court's ruling. 
Federal courts evaluating the disqualification of an arbitrator examine four factors: 
(1) the extent and character of the personal interest, if any, of the arbitrator in the 
proceedings, (2) the directness of any relationship between the arbitrator and the party he 
or she is alleged to favor, (3) the connection of that relationship to the arbitration, and (4) 
the proximity in time between the relationship and the arbitration proceedings. When 
considering each factor, the court determines whether the asserted bias is direct, definite, 
and capable of demonstration, rather than remote, uncertain or speculative. ANR Coal 
Co., Inc. v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc., 173 F. 3d 493,500 (4th Cir. 1999). 
Although a party seeking vacatur need not prove improper motives on the part of 
the arbitrator under federal law, that party "must put forward facts that objectively 
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demonstrate such a degree of partiality that a reason-able person could assume that the 
arbitrator had improper motives. The movant carries a 'heavy' burden, in order to meet 
this 'onerous' standard." Id. at 500-501 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Homes Ins. Co., 429 F. 3d 640, 645 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Washburn v. McManus, 895 F. Supp 392,399 (D. Conn. 1994), off9*, 57 F.3df 1064 (2nd 
Cir. 1995) ("The mere fact of a prior relationship is not in and of itself sufficient to 
disqualify arbitrators. The relationship between the arbitrator and the party's principal 
must be so intimate - personally, socially, professionally, or financially - as to cast 
serious doubt on the arbitrator's impartiality"). 
One of the most often cited federal cases establishing the need for an objective 
standard is Morelite Construction Corp. v. NY City District Council Carpenters Benefit 
Fund, 748 F.2d 79 (2nd Cir. 1984), cited approvingly by this Court in DeVore. See 884 
P. 2d at 1256. In Morelite, the Second Circuit upheld the disqualification of an arbitrator 
whose son was president of the Union, a district chapter of which was a party to the 
arbitration. The court narrowed its ruling and observed that 
[w]e need not, and do not, attempt to set forth a list of familial or other 
relationships that will result in the per se vacation of an arbitration award, except 
to suggest that such a list would most likely be very short. We do not intend to 
hold arbitrators to all the standards of Canon 3. 748 F.2d at 85. 
In addition to this clarification, the court also predicted post arbitration "sour 
grapes" by losing parties, stating that "[n]either do we intend that unsuccessful parties to 
arbitration may have awards set aside by seeking out and finding tenuous relationships 
between the arbitrator and the successful party." Id. 
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As one California court has more artfully stated, 
[t]he test is an objective one - whether such an impression is created in the eye of 
the hypothetical reasonable person. Thus, unless a reasonable member of the 
public at large, aware of all the facts, would fairly entertain doubts concerning the 
arbitrator's impartiality, the arbitrator is not subject to disqualification. 
Mahnke v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 4th 565, 579, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197, 206 
(2009). In this matter, a reasonable person, aware of all the facts, would not and could 
not fairly entertain doubts regarding the impartiality of Richard D. Burbidge. 
B. Although the Arbitrators All Considered Themselves Neutral and 
Conducted Themselves Accordingly After Their Appointment, Mr. 
Burbidge Was Not a "Neutral" Appointee Under the Act. 
The standard in Utah for vacating an arbitration award is steep and narrow. 
Vacatur is limited by the specific grounds set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124. 
The grounds relevant to this matter mandate vacating "an award made in the arbitration 
proceeding if (a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; (b) 
there was: (i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator; (ii) 
corruption by an arbitrator; or (iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a 
party to the arbitration proceeding." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124 (1). 
This Court has explained that "a motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award 
is limited to determining whether any of the very limited grounds for modification or 
vacatur exist." Pacific Development, L.C. v. Orton, 2001 UT 36, f6; 23 P. 3d 1035, 
(citing Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P. 2d 941,947 (Utah 1996)). Applying 
this standard, the Tenth Circuit has held that 4Cthe burden is on the party seeking to vacate 
an arbitration award ... to show that one of the limited statutory grounds exists for setting 
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aside the arbitration result That burden is very great." Young v. American Nutrition, 
Inc., 537 F.3d 1135,1141 (10th Cir 2008). 
Westgate argued that all three arbitrators in this matter were considered neutral, 
and the trial court considered Richard Burbidge as a neutral arbitrator. Exhibit 3 pp. 3, 8. 
It is true that the Panel members stated after their appointment that they considered 
themselves neutral, and conducted the proceeding accordingly. However, for purposes of 
Westgate5s motion, that did not retroactively transform their appointment into the 
appointment of three "neutrals" under the Utah Arbitration Act. Westgate's choice to 
forward copies of various State court pleading to "its" arbitrator contradicts the argument 
that it considered its chosen arbitrator to be "neutral." 
The appointees in this matter acted in an objective, professional manner 
throughout the arbitration and, as discussed in Point A supra, the same result would 
obtain regardless of whether the Act's standards for "neutrals" were applied to all three 
arbitrators. However, the trial court's failure to address the legal distinction between a 
party-appointed arbitrator and an arbitrator-appointed arbitrator was error. 
As ordered by the state court in its Order Regarding Westgate Resorts, LTD's 
Motion to Compel Arbitration (10/27/08), the process utilized in appointing arbitrators in 
this case is familiar to anyone who litigates in Utah: each party appointed an arbitrator, 
and those two arbitrators appointed a neutral. In practice, attorneys are trained to be, and 
generally are, objective in their assessments of facts and law. Nonetheless, they are not 
"neutral" appointees under the Utah Arbitration Act, and no party can reasonably claim 
otherwise. 
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Westgate's assertion and the trial court's conclusion that all three arbitrators 
should be deemed "neutral" as defined by the Act overstates the normal understanding 
regarding party-selected arbitrators, and seems to go far beyond current thought regarding 
the role of such arbitrators. The Utah Code indirectly recognizes different roles for party-
selected arbitrators and for 'neutral' arbitrators. See §§ 78B-11-112(2); 78B-11-113(5); 
78B-11-124. 
Other courts have similarly recognized that subjecting party-selected arbitrators to 
the same disclosures and disqualification requirements is inconsistent with legislation 
recognizing the different roles. See, e.g., Mahnke, 180 Cal.App.4th at 577-578; 
Washburn, 895 F.Supp. at 399 (some subjectiveness is tolerated and even expected from 
party-selected arbitrators); Daiichi Hawaii Real Estate Corp. v. Lichter, 82 P.3d 411,428 
(Hawaii 2003) ("it stands to intuitive reason that a party-appointed arbitrator might view 
the proceeding through a more subjective and partial lens than a neutral arbitrator"); 
Astoria Med Group. V. Health Ins. Plan Greater NY, 182 N.E.2d 85, 88 (N.Y. 1962) 
("the very reason each of the parties contract for the choice of his own arbitrator is to 
make certain that his 'side' will, in a sense, be represented on the tribunal"); Aetna Gas & 
Sur. Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d 88, 92 (R.I. 1991) ("it would be inappropriate to require 
the party-appointed arbitrators to adhere to the same standard of neutrality as a judge. 
That standard ignores the practical realities of arbitration panels composed of party-
appointed arbitrators"). 
As appointees whom the parties had not designated as neutral prior to their 
appointment, neither Richard Burbidge nor Judith Billings were subject to 
14 
disqualification even if he or she had a "direct and material interest" in the outcome of 
the proceeding, or an "existing and substantial relationship" with a party. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-11-112(2) limits such disqualification to arbitrators required by agreement to 
be neutral: "An individual who has a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome 
of the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a 
party may not serve as an arbitrator required by an agreement to be neutral." There was 
no such agreement here. It was the arbitrators themselves who, after the commencement 
of the arbitration, indicated their intent to be neutral (for purposes of evaluation, not as 
defined by the Act). 
AN APPEAL WILL MATERIALLY ADVANCE 
THE TERMINATION OF THE LITIGATION 
Unless interlocutory review is granted, the parties will be forced to start over in an 
arbitration that has already cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. Conversely, if review 
is granted and the trial court's ruling is overturned, CPG will be entitled to judgment on 
the arbitration award as a matter of law, because the first-cousin issue was Westgate's 
sole grounds for objecting to confirmation of the award. Under these circumstances, 
review of the trial court's order both materially affects the final decision in the cases, and 
better serves the administration and interests of justice. 
WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD DECIDE THIS CASE 
This case has been aggressively litigated for more than six years. Without 
question, review in this Court will be sought of any ruling by the Court of Appeals. The 
Supreme Court has consistently declared the enforcement of arbitration awards a matter 
15 
of legislative, judicial, and public policy, and direct review by the Court is necessary to 
further the goal of providing an expedient means of resolving disputes. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, CPG requests the Court grant leave to bring an 
interlocutory appeal to resolve the issue of whether a first cousin relationship with an 
attorney not directly involved in the case, without more, triggered a duty to disclose on 
the part of the arbitrator and provided a basis for vacating the arbitration award. 
DATED this 22^ day of December, 2010. 
L. Rich Humpherys 
Karra J. Porter 
Scot A. Boyd 
Alain C. Balmanno 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Consumer Protection Group, LLC 
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CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 323-5000 
Facsimile: (801)355-3472 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER 
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC, 
Defendants. 
| MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Case No. 20101017 SC 
Pursuant to U.R.A.P. 10(a)(2)(B), Appellant/Counterclaimant Consumer 
Protection Group, LLC ("CPG"), moves this court to summarily reverse the trial 
court's ruling on the grounds that it was manifest error for the court to intereprt the 
Utah Arbitration Act as requiring vacatur of an arbitration award due to non-
disclosure of a bare first-cousin relationship. This Motion is supported by a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Disposition. 
DATED this Hf\ day of March, 2011. 
&AZ\ 
L. Rich HumpW 
Karra J. Porter 
Scot A. Boyd 
Alain C. Balmanno 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that, on the J_ jJ_)day of March, 2011, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was sent to the following by the method indicated below: 
Todd Shaughnessy 
David P. Williams 
Troy L. Booher 
SNELL&WILMER 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Richard W. Epstein 
Rebecca F. Bratter 
Trade Center South, Suite 700 
100 West Cypress Creek Road 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309-2140 
U.S. MAIL 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
—00O00— UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
APR * • 2011 
Case No. 20101017 -SC 
Shaun S. Adel, and Consumer Protection 
Group, LLC, 
Appellant 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on Appellant's motion for summary 
reversal. The motion is deferred until plenary presentation on the merits. The 
stay imposed in response to the filing of the motion is lifted. As to the 
arguments raised in connection with the motion the parties may choose to rest 
on the pleadings they have submitted or may address the matter as they see fit 
in briefing and/or at argument. 
Date 
Westgate Resorts, Ltd., 
Appellee, 
v. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Matthew B. Durrant 
Associate Chief Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on April 5,2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or placed in Interdepartmental 
mailing to be delivered to: 
SHAUN S. ADEL 
177 RIVERSIDE AVE STE F-1043 
NEWPORT BEACH CA 92663 
L.RICHHUMPHERYS 
KARRA J. PORTER 
SCOT A. BOYD 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN PC 
15 W S TEMPLE STE 800 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
MICHAEL D. ZIMMERMAN 
DAVTD P. WILLIAMS 
TROYL.BOOHER 
CHRISTOPHER L. STOUT 
SNELL & WTLMER LLP 
15 W S TEMPLE STE 1200 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-1004 
RICHARD W. EPSTEIN 
MICHAEL MARDER 
GREENSPOON MARDER PA 
100 W CYPRESS CREEK RD STE 700 
FORT LAUDERDALE FL 33309 
Dated this April 5,2011. 
By ^/uUM^^^^ 
Judicial Assistant 
Case No. 20101017 
District Court No. 020404068 
TabH 
Richard W. Epstein, E$q. (admitted ; w hac vice) 
Rebecca F. Bratter, Eiej. (admitted pro hue vice) 
GREENSPOON MARDER, P.A. 
Trade Cadre So*la,Ste. 700 
100 W o t Cyprus CredcRoad 
Fort Lnideniale.KL 33309 
Telephone: (954) 491-1120 
FicdmlU: (954) 343-6958 
Attorneys for Westgate Retorts, Ltd. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
OTAHCOUNTY,STATKOFOTAH 
WBSTOATB ASSORTS, LTD., 
Plaintiff 
VS. 
SHAUNS.ADBL and CONSUMER 
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC, 
Defendants. : 
ORDER ON CONSUMER PROTECTION 
GROUP, LLC'S COMBINED MOTION 
TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD 
AND FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND 
| EXPENSES AND FOR SOLE 54(1) 
[ CERTIFICATION OF JUDGMENT AS 
! FINAL, AND WESTGATE RESORTS 
LTD.* MOTION TO VACATE 
ARBITRATION AWARD 
CMC No.: 020404068 
DivisionNo.8 
Judge: Lyon W.Davis 
Pimuant to this Court's Ruling dated September 30,2010, attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
and incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that: 
1. Westgate Resorts, Ltd,1* Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award is GRANTED; 
FILED 
DEC 1 3 2Q1IT 
4TH DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
2. The Findings of Pact, Conclusions of Law and Arbitration Award dated February 
2, 2010 issued in tho arbitration proceedings styled: Consumer Protection Group* LLC v. 
Westgate Resorts, Ltd., is VACATED, RENDfiRBD NULL AND VOID end OP NO FORCE 
AND EFFECT; and 
3. Consumer Protection Group, LLC's Combined Motion to Confirm Arbitration 
Award and for Attorney Fees and Expense* and For Rule 54(b) Certification of Judgment as 
Final is DENIED, 
DATED this \ y day of«etriM4 2010. 
Approved Aa To Form: 
CHRISTENSEN&JENSEN,P.C. 
I t t3^| |2MMUBKMOT 
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FILED 
SEP 3 0 2 0 1 0 ^ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER 
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Date: September 30,2010 
Case No.: 020404068 
Judge: Lynn W. Davis 
I. Procedural Posture 
This matter comes before the Court on two outstanding motions: Consumer Protection 
Group's Combined Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and for Attorney Fees and Expenses 
and For Rule 54(B) Certification of Judgment as Final, and Westgate Resorts' Opposition to 
Consumer Protection Group's Combined Motion and Westgate Resorts' Motion to Vacate 
Arbitration Award. 
II. Arguments of the Parties 
& Consumer Protection Group's Arguments in Support of Combined Motion 
Consumer Protection Group ("CPG") states that a highly qualified arbitration panel 
issued an award of $65,500 in favor of CPG and against Westgate Resorts ("Westgate")- The 
Utah Arbitration Act requires the district court to issue an order confirming the aibitration award 
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unless the award is modified or corrected pursuant to statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 7SB-11-
123. CPG argues that based on this, the arbitration award should be confirmed. 
Further, CPG argues entitlement to attorney fees and costs associated with the arbitration 
and Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act ("UPUAA") claims. CPG seeks attorney fees on two 
independent grounds. First, the UPUAA entitles a prevailing plaintiff to recover reasonable 
attorney fees and expenses. Id §76-10-1605(2). Second, the Utah Arbitration Act provides that 
a "court may allow reasonable costs of the motion [to confirm] and subsequent judicial 
proceedings," Id § 78B-1 M26(2); Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P2d 
941,953 (Utah 1996). In the instant case, Westgate refused to voluntarily pay the arbitration 
award, forcing CPG to file this motion to confirm. 
Finally, CPG requests the arbitration judgment to be certified as a final order under Rule 
54(B), as there is no just reason for delay and there is no overlap in this judgment and any other 
remaining issues in the case. 
h± Westgate1 s Arguments in Opposition to Combined Motion and in Support of Motion to 
Vacate Arbitration Award 
Westgate avers that the arbitrator chosen by CPG, Richard D. Burbidge, is a first cousin 
to CPG attorney George W. Burbidge II. Based on this feet alone, as supported by abundant law, 
this Court should deny CPG's Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and grant Westgate's 
Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award. 
Westgate argues that the statute which requires the Court to confirm an arbitration award 
has a key exception; the Court has a duty to confirm unless "the award is vacated pursuant to 
Section 78B-11-124." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-123. The exception statute states that the 
Court shall vacate an arbitration award if there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed 
as a neutral arbitrator, corruption or misconduct by an arbitrator. 
Required disclosures, found in Utah Code 78B-11-113, include an existing or past 
relationship between any arbitrator and any counsel or representatives of a party to the 
arbitration. The statute imposes a duty to disclose to all parties and to other arbitrators any facts 
"which a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator," Id 
§ 78B-11-113(2). The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes requires 
arbitrators to disclose facts regarding any personal relationship which might affect impartiality or 
independence in the eyes of any of the parties. Further, any doubt should be resolved in favor of 
disclosure. 
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Westgate asserts that there was no such disclosure. In this case, the arbitrators had the 
power to award $1,2 million in attorney fees to CPG. George Burbidge's direct financial interest 
in the outcome of the case, left in the hands of the first cousin Richard Burbidge, is surely a 
reason to doubt the validity of any such award. Westgate should have been informed of this 
decision so Westgate could choose to demand disqualification from the Panel. Further, the lack 
of disclosure to the other arbitrators surely poisoned the well, calling into question any decision 
of the Panel. 
Westgate further argues that it does not matter that Arbitrator Burbidge was selected by 
CPG. There was still a duty to disclose. CPG cannot argue that Westgate knew that Arbitrator 
Burbidge was not neutral because the Panel prepared a fee agreement in which the arbitrators 
designated themselves as neutral arbitrators. The arbitrators were bound by the Code of Ethics, 
and thus bound by duty to disclose any potential conflicts or reasons for impartiality, such as a 
familial relationship with a party or its counsel. 
Under section 78B-11-113(4) an arbitrator's failure to disclose a fact such as an existing 
or past relationship with a party's counsel, is grounds for vacating under 78B-U-124(b). Failure 
to disclose constitutes "evident patriality" Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental 
Casualty < X 393 U.S. 145,148 (1968). 
The Utah Ethics Advisory Committee has opined that the participation of a cousin may 
result in judicial disqualification. Further, if the judge's impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned, the judge should either recuse or disclose the relationship to the parties to allow them 
to decide whether recusal is warranted. 
£. CPQ's Arguments Against Westgate's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award 
CPG argues that Westgate has waived any rights to seek recusal. First, the timing of 
Westgate's Motion to Vacate, given its history in this litigation, is suspect Losing parties in an 
arbitration should not get a second bite at the apple when the facts show that the losing party 
should have discovered their basis for disqualification or recusal before the arbitration. 
CPG asks the Court to look at the timing of the motion to vacate, which is clear evidence 
of Westgate's motive. Further, Westgate has a histoiy of making prior late discoveries, costing 
the parties great expense and time. 
Moreover, CPG argues that Arbitrator Burbidge was not technically neutral under the 
Utah Arbitration Act. However, the arbitrators did consider themselves neutral after their 
appointment and conducted themselves accordingly. 
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Party-selected arbitrators are clearly not the same as arbitrator-appointed arbitrators. 
Courts have recognized the differences between them. For example, it is reasonable that party-
selected arbitrators might have some subjectiveness and they are not expected to adhere to the 
same standard of neutrality as a judge. In fact, even if a party-selected arbitrator had a substantial 
relationship with a party or attorney, the law states that the arbitrator "may not serve as an 
arbitrator required by an agreement to be neutral." Id § 78B-11-112(2) (emphasis added). 
CPG points out that there was no such neutrality agreement; it was added by the arbitrators 
themselves after they commenced the arbitration. 
Even if all the arbitrators had been neutral, CPG argues that Westgate did not even come 
close to making a prima facie case for disqualification. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that to 
vacate an arbitration award, "the evidence of partiality must be certain and direct, not remote, 
uncertain, or speculative." DeVore v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 884 P^d 1246,1256 (Utah 1994), 
CPG argues that Westgate's motion is full of speculation. The only fact alleged is that the 
Burbidges are first cousin. Eveiy other "fact" drawn from that is mere hypothesis and conjecture. 
Further, CPG contends that Westgate misquoted a Utah Ethics Advisory Committee 
opinion regarding whether a judge who is a cousin to one of the parties should recuse. The full 
quote shows that the cousin relationship is relevant only "if a close personal relationship exists." 
Utah Ethics Advisory Committee, Informal Opinion 89-5. 
George Burbidge II and Richard Burbidge do not have a close personal relationship. 
Richard is one of 22 first cousins of George, They are nearly 20 years apart in age. They do not 
speak regularly, have no active social relationship, no business or personal connection, and in 
feet have not spoken in many months. Indeed, the Burbidges have been adverse to each other in 
litigation before. A mere genetic relationship does not constitute a substantial relationship 
requiring disclosure or recusal. 
CPG argues that Westgate has provided no evidence supporting claims of corruption, 
fraud, undue means, or evident partiality. Arbitrator Burbidge has no interest in the outcome of 
the arbitration, and no existing substantial relationship with any party* Because no evidence to 
support any of the statutory or judicially created grounds exists, a motion to vacate an award 
must be denied. Buzas Baseball Inc. v Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d at 951. 
Moreover, federal decisions do not support Westgate's argument. CPG cites several 
federal cases to show that the standard to vacate an arbitration award is a heavy, onerous burden, 
and that the mere existence of a genetic relationship or the mere fact of a prior relationship is not 
sufficient to cast doubt on the arbitrator's impartiality. If a reasonable person objectively 
viewing all the facts would fairly entertain doubts about impartiality, then the arbitrator would be 
subject to disqualification. CPG alleges that once all the fects are known about the relationship 
between the two Burbidges, no reasonable person could have doubts about Arbitrator Burbidge's 
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impartiality. Also, general guidelines from the American Arbitration Association and found in 
the Uniform Arbitration Act do not support vacating this award under these circumstances. 
Finally, CPG asserts that Westgate's motion is brought in bad faith. Westgate did not file 
a certificate that the motion was filed in good faith, which would have been required in a motion 
to disqualify a judge under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63. Westgate's long history of 
attacking CPG and delaying the judicial process continues with the motion to vacate. Without 
supporting evidence, Westgate accuses Arbitrator Burbidge and CPG of impropriety and bias. 
These accusations should not be tolerated. 
Based on the foregoing, CPG seeks confirmation of the arbitration award and denial of 
Westgate's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award. 
dL Westgate's Reply Arguments to CPG's Opposition to Westgate's Motion to Vacate 
In reply, Westgate argues that it never waived the right to move to vacate based on 
Arbitrator Burbidge's failure to make a statutorily required disclosure. The burden was not on 
Westgate to discover an improper link between arbitrator and attorney; the burden was on the 
parties so linked to disclose. See Utah Code Ann. § 78R-11-113. 
Further, the concealment of the relationship calls into question the impartiality of the 
arbitrator. Thus, both the relationship and the concealment of the relationship create doubts as to 
the validity of the outcome of the arbitration. Also, CPG's citation of Rule 63 and its 20-day 
deadline is not applicable in this case as the rule applies only to judges. 
The emails show that Westgate brought this issue to the attention of the parties as soon as 
it noticed the similarity in names. After confirmation that the Burbidges were first cousins, 
Westgate immediately sent a letter to the Panel raising the issue. There was no bad-faith delay by 
Westgate. The bad faith is by CPG, who failed to make required disclosures, and Arbitrator 
Burbidge, who is statutorily required by Subsection 78B-11-113(1) to disclose before accepting 
appointment. 
Moreover; Westgate argues that CPG's contention that Burbidge was not neutral simply 
confirms the doubts as to his impartiality. It also goes against the Arbitration Fee Agreement, 
which stated that "[t]he pane! members each consider themselves as neutral arbitrators." Also, 
because Burbidge told the parties he was neutral, then any argument that there was no duty to 
disclose the relationship is wrong. Westgate had every reason and right to believe that the Panel 
was composed of neutral arbitrators, based on the parties' agreement, on statutory law, and on the 
representation of the Panel. 
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Westgate reiterates that according to Utah statute, an arbitrator who does not disclose a 
relationship with counsel "is presumed to act with evident partiality." Id § 78B-11-113(5), 
Thus, Westgate did not have to produce evidence of partiality because the failure to disclose 
gives rise to a presumption of partiality. The Panel itself expressly adopted the AAA Code of 
Ethics, which requires all arbitrators, whether neutral or not, to disclose any facts which might 
affect their neutrality, independence and partiality. A familial relationship is obviously one 
which falls within the type of information that might reasonably affect impartiality and should be 
disclosed. See Burlington Northern Railroad Corp v. TUCO, Inc., 960 S. W.2d 629,637 (Tex. 
1997). Westgate also argues that CPG's cited cases do not support its contention. 
Finally, Westgate contends that CPO has engaged in distortion, deceit, and 
misrepresentation. 
Based on the foregoing, Westgate requests this Court to vacate the arbitration award. 
HI. Ruling 
The Court reluctantly grants Westgate's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award and denies 
CPG's Combined Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and for Attorney Fees and Expenses and 
For Rule 54(B) Certification of Judgment as Final. The Utah Uniform Arbitration Act provides: 
(1) Before accepting appointment, an individual who is requested 
to serve as an arbitrator, after making a reasonable inquiry, shall 
disclose to all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration 
proceeding and to any other arbitrators any known facts that a 
reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality 
of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, including: 
(b) an existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the 
agreement to arbitrate or the arbitration proceeding, their counsel 
or representatives, a witness, or another arbitrator. 
(4) If the arbitrator did not disclose a feet as required by Subsection 
(1) or (2), upon timely objection by a party, the court under 
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Subsection 78B-1 l-124(l)(b) may vacate an award. 
(5) An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator who does not 
disclose a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of 
the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial 
relationship with a party is presumed to act with evident partiality 
under Subsection 78B-ll-124(I)(b). 
Utah Code Ann, § 78B-11-113. Additionally, "(a]n individual who h a s . . . a known, existing, 
and substantial relationship with a party may not serve as an arbitrator required by an agreement 
to be neutral," under § 78B-11-112(2). 
When an arbitrator fails to disclose or otherwise violates the rights of a party to the 
proceeding, § 78B-11-124 provides: 
(1) Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration 
proceeding, the court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration 
proceeding if: 
(b) there was: 
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral 
arbitrator; [or] 
(iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to 
the arbitration proceeding. 
Such motion must be filed within 90 days. See Id If the Court grants that motion, then the Court 
is not required to issue an order confirming the award. See Id § 78B-11-123. 
The question at issue is whether Richard D. Burbidge should have disclosed his 
relationship to counsel. A first cousin relationship is a feet that an arbitrator would be required to 
disclose because a reasonable person would consider this fact likely to affect the impartiality of 
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the arbitrator. In the present case, the arbitrator Richard D. Burbidge did not disclose his 
relationship to counsel as he was required to do by statute. 
CPG asserts the relationship is not particularly close and that this omission does not meet 
the standard to vacate the award because "the evidence of partiality must be certain and direct, 
not remote, uncertain, or speculative." DeVore v. 1HCHospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 1246,1256. But 
the standard is not proof-of-actual-bias; this standard would be neigh impossible to meet Id The 
"certain and direct, not remote, uncertain, or speculative" evidence must be evidence of facts that 
ua reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator." Utah Code 
Ann. §78B-11-113. The first cousin relationship is an uncontroverted feet 
The quality of the Burbidges' relationship does not change Arbitrator Burbidge's duty to 
disclose. Though CPG argues a judge in a similar situation need not recuse, the Supreme Court 
of the United States has ruled, "[W]e should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to safeguard 
die impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the former have completely free rein to decide 
the law as well as the facts and are not subject to appellate review. We can perceive no way in 
which the effectiveness of the arbitration process will be hampered by the simple requirement 
that the arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible 
bias." Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145,148 (1968). 
Additionally, the arbitrators were all designated as neutral in the fee agreement Even if 
this was done sua sponte, the designation that they were neutral is in a fonnal agreement with the 
parties. Under Utah Code § 78B-11-112(2), Arbitrator Burbidge, in the absence of disclosure, 
should not have served at all, and under § 78B-11-113(5) his service creates a presumption of 
partiality. 
His failure to disclose the relationship as required by § 78B-11-113(l)(b) violated the 
rights of Westgate to know the facts Arbitrator Burbidge was required to reveal, and he is 
presumed partial under § 78B-11-113(5), CPG's argument that Westgate's motion should be 
denied for timeliness fails. The statue sets the time limit at 90 days. The award was entered 
February 2,2010. Westgate filed its motion April 8,2010. Westgate's motion was timely. 
Therefore, this Court vacates the arbitration award according to §§ 78B-1 M24(l)(b)(i) and (iii). 
Westgate's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award is granted. 
CPG's Combined Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and for Attorney Fees and 
Expenses and For Rule 54(b) Certification of Judgement as Final is denied. 
The Court instructs counsel for Westgate to prepare an order consistent with this opinion. 
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Dated this J&^lay of J&dA^f/ai. 2010. 
Judge Lynn W. 
Fourth Judicial Disi 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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